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I. INTRODUCTION
Based on a 2001 study commissioned to justify the repeal of restrictions
on smoking in the Czech Republic, Philip Morris advocated that tobacco had
saved the Czech government about $147,000,000 in reduced health care costs,
pensions, and housing expenditures for the elderly due to smokers' early
deaths. The report was met with disgust that such morbid considerations
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should be used to inform tobacco policy, 2 prompting a public apology from
Philip Morris.3 Subsequent reviews of the analysis on which the report was
based revealed that the economic costs of smoking-including health care,
absenteeism and fires-were actually thirteen times higher than the so-called
"benefits."
4
Philip Morris's flawed economic analysis is a classic example of the
lengths to which the tobacco industry5 has gone over the last several decades
to secure new markets in the developing world. The industry's tactics have
also included promotional techniques prohibited in the United States, 6
disinformation campaigns calculated to obscure the health consequences of
smoking, and covert political lobbying aimed at thwarting the adoption of
effective tobacco control legislation.7 The result has been an unprecedented
increase in the consumption of tobacco products and a corresponding rise in
8tobacco-related illnesses. The World Health Organization (WHO) predicts
1. See Arthur D. Little Inc., Public Finance Balance of Smoking in the Czech Republic
(2001), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/philipmorris/pmczechstudy.pdf.
2. See CLIVE BATES, ACTION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, DEATH AND TAXES: A RESPONSE
TO THE PHILIP MORRIS STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF SMOKING ON PUBLIC FINANCES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
1 (2001) (noting that Philip Morris's study elicited condemnation based on the "repellent concept or
[sic] selling the value of early death to a government").
3. See Press Release, Altria, Philip Morris Companies, Inc. Comments Regarding Czech
Study (July 26, 2001), available at http://www.altria.com/media/pressrelease/03_02_pr2001_07
26 01.asp (noting that "the funding and public release of the [Czech] study ... exhibited terrible
judgment as well as a complete and unacceptable disregard of basic human values").
4. See Clive Bates, Study Shows That Smoking Costs 13 Times More Than It Saves, 323
BRIT. MED. J. 1003, 1003 (2001) (noting that the Philip Morris study improperly counted tobacco tax
revenue as a benefit given that consumers would purchase other taxed items if the Czech Republic
banned smoking).
5. The tobacco industry is dominated by Philip Morris International, British-American
Tobacco (BAT), and Japan Tobacco, which together account for more than half of all global sales of
cigarettes outside of China. See Stephen D. Sugarman, International Aspects of Tobacco Control and the
Proposed WHO Treaty, in REGULATING TOBACCO 250 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds.,
2001). Philip Morris, which is based in the United States, controls about sixteen percent of the global
tobacco market. England-based BAT has become nearly as large as Philip Morris as a result of its
merger with Rothmans International in 1999. Japan Tobacco, based in Japan, has controlled nearly ten
percent of the world market since 1999, when it purchased the international rights to R.J. Reynolds'
cigarette brands. Id.
6. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2002) (advocating clear, truthful, and uniform cigarette
labeling and advertising requirements that adequately inform the public about the adverse health affects
of cigarettes); 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2002) (banning cigarette advertisements on any medium of electronic
communication); Master Settlement Agreement at 18, Nat'l Assoc. of Attorneys General v. Philip
Morris, Inc. (1998), http://naag.org/upload/1032468605_cigmsa.pdf (prohibiting tobacco companies
from targeting children in the advertising, promotion, and marketing of cigarettes); Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control-Provisional Agenda Item 4.9, Pan American Health Organization
[PAHO], 53d Sess., PAHO Doc. CD43/13 (2001), available at http://www.paho.org/English/
GOV/CD/cd43_13-e.pdf (confirming that tobacco promotion is largely unregulated outside of North
America);
7. See PAHO, PROFITS OVER PEOPLE: TOBACCO INDUSTRY ACTIVITIES TO MARKET
CIGARETTES AND UNDERMINE PUBLIC HEALTH IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (2002),
http://www.paho.org/English/HPP/HPM/TOH/profits over_people.pdf; Ross HAMMOND, ADDICTED TO
PROFIT: BIG TOBACCO'S EXPANDING GLOBAL REACH (1998).
8. See HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 11; R. Doll, et al., Mortality in Relation to Smoking: 40
Years' Observations on Male British Doctors, 309 BRIT. MED. J. 901 (1994) (concluding that about half
of all regular cigarette smokers will eventually be killed by their habit).
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that nearly six million people in developing countries will die of tobacco-
related illnesses by 2020.9
Many governments are complicit in causing their citizens to contract
tobacco-related illnesses that lead to death. Empirical evidence demonstrates
that certain types of tobacco control initiatives-including tobacco advertising
bans, cigarette tax increases, prohibitions on smoking in public, and
subsidized tobacco cessation programs-reduce the consumption of tobacco
products. By failing to undertake such initiatives, governments give tobacco
companies license to expand their base of prospective consumers, who incur
the risks of nicotine addiction, illness, and untimely death and subject those
around them to the life-threatening risks of exposure to secondhand smoke. In
cases where these risks become realities, the governments' failures violate
their citizens' internationally recognized rights to health and life. 10 To the
extent that individuals are not cognizant of the risks of consuming tobacco
products or exposure to secondhand smoke, whether due to a lack of
awareness or deceptive promotional techniques employed by the tobacco
industry, their governments are also violating their internationally recognized
right to freedom of information.tt
9. See Press Release, WHO, Illicit Tobacco Trade Contributes to Global Disease Burden
(July 30, 2002), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/releases/who62/en/print.html.
10. The rights to health and life are guaranteed by numerous international treaties. Regarding
the right to health, see, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION CONSTITUTION, July 22, 1946, pmbl., 62
Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185, 186-87 [hereinafter WHO CONST.]; Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Nov. 20, 1989, art. 24, 28 I.L.M. 1457, 1465-66 [hereinafter CRC]; Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San
Salvador), Nov. 17, 1988, art. 10, 28 I.L.M. 156, 164; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
June 27, 1981, art. 16, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 248-49 [hereinafter African Charter]; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, arts. 11.1(f), 12, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13, 18-19 [hereinafter CEDAW]; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 12, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, art. 5(e)(iv), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 222
[hereinafter ICERD]; European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, art. 11, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, 104. Regarding
the right to life, see, e.g., African Charter, supra, art. 4, 1520 U.N.T.S. at 247; American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 145-46 [hereinafter ACHR]; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174-75 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 224, amended by Protocol No. 11, May 11, 1994, 155 E.T.S. I (entered
into force Nov. 1, 1998), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/convention/webconveneng.pdf
[hereinafter European Convention].
For discussions of the tobacco control implications of the rights to health and life, see Robin
Appleberry, Breaking the Camel's Back. Bringing Women's Human Rights to Bear on Tobacco Control,
13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 71, 84-88 (2001) (characterizing governments' failures to prevent tobacco-
related deaths and to provide regular health screenings for female tobacco users and gender-specific
treatment for tobacco-related diseases as violations of women's human rights); Lucien Dhooge, Smoke
Across the Waters: Tobacco Production and Exportation As International Human Rights Violations, 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 355, 414-24 (1998) (arguing that the U.S. government's subsidization and
exportation of tobacco products is inconsistent with the rights to life and health); Jonathan Wike, The
Marlboro Man in Asia: U.S. Tobacco and Human Rights, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 329, 351-52
(1996) (characterizing the promotion of tobacco consumption as a violation of the right to health).
11. The right to freedom of information is guaranteed by the African Charter, supra note 10,
art. 9, 1520 U.N.T.S. at 247; the ACHR, supra note 10, art. 13, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 148-49; the ICCPR,
supra note 10, art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178; the European Convention, supra note 10, art. 10, 213
U.N.T.S. at 230. For discussions of the tobacco control implications of the right to freedom of
information, see Appleberry, supra note 10, at 78-82 (characterizing government failures to provide
gender-specific information on tobacco, increase women's access to education, inform women of the
tobacco industry's deceptive marketing tactics, ensure gender-sensitive care and health promotion,
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29: 209
Through effective lobbying, the tobacco industry actively encourages the
governments of developing countries to violate the rights of their citizens by
thwarting the passage of proposed legislation.12 In Ukraine, for example,
Philip Morris prevented the passage of advertising restrictions in the early
1990s by clandestinely producing an information packet that was used to
lobby the Ukrainian Parliament.' The cover of the packet depicted crushed
tobacco leaves forming the figure of $400 million and bore the message,
"That's the amount that Ukraine's economy will lose in the next five years as
the result of a ban on tobacco advertising."1 4 Lacking any evidence to the
contrary, the Ukrainian Parliament rescinded most of the advertising
restrictions that had impeded the tobacco industry's promotional efforts.15 In
order to undermine efforts by certain Middle Eastern governments to restrict
smoking in public places, Philip Morris published studies intended to "restore
smoker confidence" and to refute evidence of the harmful effects of
secondhand smoke. 16 Similarly, in Latin America, Philip Morris and British-
American Tobacco (BAT) co-finance the Environmental Tobacco Smoke
Consultants Project, which generates data intended to challenge the scientific
consensus on the harmful effects of exposure to secondhand smoke. 7 In 1992,
both companies collaborated to achieve a presidential veto of a comprehensive
advertising ban in Argentina. 18 Their joint lobbying efforts, which targeted
journalists, allies in the advertising industry, and government officials, denied
the existence of any connection between cigarette advertising and
consumption. 19
prevent censoring of female media organizations by the tobacco industry, and support scientific research
on women and tobacco as violations of women's human rights); Dhooge, supra note 10, at 431-35
(contending that the U.S. government's failure to address the adverse impact of the advertising and
misinformation campaigns conducted by U.S. tobacco companies overseas renders the United States
complicit in violations of the right to freedom of information).
12. Certain developing countries, including Thailand, Bangladesh, Brazil, South Africa, and
Poland, have managed to undertake strong tobacco control initiatives despite pressure from foreign
tobacco companies. These successes are attributable to a wide range of factors, including systematic and
concerted efforts of non-governmental organizations in Thailand and Bangladesh, persistent action by
the government in Brazil, and charismatic advocates in South Africa and Poland, all of whom took
advantage of the opportunities presented by dramatic political and social changes in their countries. For
detailed case-studies of these countries, see WORLD BANK, TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY: STRATEGIES,
SUCCESSES AND SETBACKS (Joy de Beyer & Linda Waverley Brigden eds., 2003).
13. Ross HAMMOND, WHO, TOBACCO ADVERTISING & PROMOTION: THE NEED FOR A
COORDINATED GLOBAL RESPONSE 24 (2000).
14. Id. (intemal citation omitted). The information packet was ostensibly produced by the
"Association of Independent Advisors on the Question of Reviving the Ukrainian Tobacco Sector,"
which actually did not exist. Id.
15. Id. Economic analyses undertaken by the World Bank demonstrate that the long-term
social and health costs of nicotine addiction far outweigh the short-term economic benefits derived from
tobacco cultivation and sales. WORLD BANK, CURBING THE EPIDEMIC: GOVERNMENT AND THE
ECONOMICS OF TOBACCO CONTROL 8-10 (1999); Press Release, WHO, World No-Tobacco Day 1995:
Tobacco Costs More Than You Think! (May 30, 1995), available at http://www.who.int/archives/inf-pr-
1995/pr95-41 .html.
16. See REGIONAL OFFICE FOR THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, WHO, 2 VOICE OF TRUTH 3-
9, at http://208.48.48.190/TFI/VoiceOfrruthVol2.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2003).
17. See PAHO, supra note 7, at 41-44.
18. See id. at 26.
19. Id. See also U.K. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EFFECT OF TOBACCO ADVERTISING ON TOBACCO
CONSUMPTION: A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE, para. 69 (1992) (asserting that the
balance of evidence supports the conclusion that advertising has a positive effect on the consumption of
tobacco products).
Smokescreens and State Responsibility
Even developing country governments that resist the pressures imposed
by multinational tobacco companies may not be able to succeed unilaterally in
promoting tobacco control within their borders. 20 The advent of cable and
satellite television, the increasing popularity of the Internet, and the free
circulation of foreign newspapers and magazines curtail the effectiveness of
national advertising bans.2 1 The prevalence of cross-border tobacco smuggling
further allows the tobacco industry to penetrate less accessible markets by
establishing strategic footholds in developing countries with less stringent
regulations.22
The increasing recognition that effective tobacco control requires a
coordinated international response provided the impetus for the development
of a global regulatory strategy under the auspices of the WHO. Due to the
uncertain political viability of obtaining consensus on a conventional treaty
structure, WHO's governing body, the World Health Assembly (WHA), opted
for a framework convention, which can be supplemented by specialized
protocols.
23
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) puts the onus
on States Parties to undertake appropriate initiatives to protect present and
future generations from the devastating health, social, environmental, and
economic consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to secondhand
smoke.24 The success of the treaty will ultimately depend on the number of
countries that agree to be bound by this regime and their willingness to fulfill
the obligations it imposes. In Part II of this Article, I elaborate on the genesis
of the FCTC and highlight problematic aspects of the existing mechanisms for
securing compliance by States Parties.
In Part III, I propose a supplemental strategy for advancing the
objectives of the FCTC within and beyond the jurisdictions of governments
that have ratified it. I argue that because governments violate their citizens'
basic human rights by failing to undertake effective tobacco control
initiatives, tobacco control advocates could constructively utilize established
international and regional human rights institutions to promote their agendas. I
also consider how emerging jurisprudence on state responsibility impacts the
scope of governments' obligations to regulate the activities of private tobacco
companies within their jurisdictions.
In Part IV, I explore how four existing human rights institutions could be
used to promote global tobacco control. These particular fora-the United
20. See Gro Harlem Brundtland, WHO, Opening of the Seminar on Tobacco Industry
Disclosures: Implications for Public Policy (Oct. 20, 1998), at http://www.who.int/director-
general/speeches/1998/english/19981020-tfi.html (acknowledging that efforts of individual
governments, national nongovernmental organizations, and media advocates are not alone sufficient to
advance tobacco control initiatives),
21. See Sugarman, supra note 5, at 256-57.
22. See id. at 252-59; Allyn Taylor & Douglas W. Bettcher, WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control: A Global 'Good'for Public Health, 78 BULL. WHO 920,924 (2000).
23. See International Framework Convention for Tobacco Control, WHA Res. 49.17, 49th
Ass., 6th plen. mtg., WHO Doc. A49/VR/6 (1996); Allyn L. Taylor & Ruth Roemer, International
Strategy for Tobacco Control, paras. 1, 14, 15, 62-64, 67, WHO Doc. WHO/PSA/96.6 (1996).
24. See WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 56th Ass., 4th plen. mtg., Annex,
Agenda Item 13, art. 3, WHO Doc. WHA56.1 (2003), http://www.who.int/gb/EB-WHA/PDF/WHA56/
ea56rl .pdf [hereinafter FCTC].
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Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, and
the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights-are significant
because of the spectrum of mechanisms that they employ to secure state
compliance with the treaties that they were established to enforce. These fora
can be used to develop a body of jurisprudence that clarifies governments'
obligations to make reasonable efforts to prevent tobacco-related human rights
violations. I also recommend that the tobacco control community seek to
integrate into the FCTC some or all of the implementation mechanisms that
these fora employ.
In Part V, I acknowledge that the effectiveness of international human
rights institutions, like the FCTC, ultimately depends on the willingness of
national legislatures and courts to implement their decisions. Using examples
from India, Bangladesh, and Uganda, I argue that successful litigation filed in
one country can precipitate favorable jurisprudential developments in other
countries and on the international level.
I conclude that the promulgation of the FCTC, the increased use of
human rights institutions, and strategic human rights litigation in national
courts will not only foster the evolution of favorable tobacco control
jurisprudence, but also will bring new perspectives to bear on the challenge of
promoting global tobacco control. It is my hope that this Article will advance
both of these goals.
II. THE FCTC: ORIGINS AND OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION
Recognizing that the increasing interdependence of tobacco markets
made a global regulatory structure indispensable, delegates to the Ninth World
Conference on Tobacco or Health adopted a resolution in October 1994
urging the WHO to adopt an international strategy for tobacco control.25
Given the uncertain political feasibility of an international treaty, the World
Health Assembly requested WHO's Director-General, Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima,
to report on the viability of alternative approaches "such as guidelines, a
declaration or an international convention on tobacco control to be adopted by
the United Nations, taking into account existing trade and other conventions
25. See Coordination Questions-Multisectoral Collaboration on Tobacco or Health-
Progress Made in the Implementation of Multisectoral Collaboration on Tobacco or Health-Report of
the Secretary General, U.N. ESCOR, Substantive Sess. of 1995, para. 26 & Annex 2, U.N. Doc.
E/1995/67 (1995). The resolution, which was drafted by Ruth Roemer and introduced by Dr. Judith
Mackay, a Senior Policy Adviser to WHO's Tobacco Free Initiative, was based on a poster presentation
by Allyn Taylor at the Ninth World Conference on Tobacco or Health. Taylor had previously published
an article advocating that WHO use its constitutional authority to develop international conventions to
advance global health. See Allyn Lise Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal
Framework for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 326 (1992).
Pursuant to Roemer's suggestion, Taylor applied her ideas to the field of tobacco control as part of her
doctoral dissertation at Columbia University School of Law. Telephone Interview with Allyn Taylor,
Adjunct Professor, University of Maryland Law School, Former Senior Legal Adviser to WHO Tobacco
Free Initiative (Aug. 19, 2003). See also Judith Mackay, The Making of a Convention on Tobacco
Control, 81 BULL. WHO 551 (2003). Taylor's doctoral dissertation was subsequently published by The
Yale Journal of International Law. Allyn L. Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for Global
Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 257 (1996) [hereinafter Taylor, An International Regulatory
Strategy].
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and treaties., 26 To this end, WHO hired Professors Allyn Taylor and Ruth
Roemer as consultants. On July 27, 1995, Taylor and Roemer submitted a
detailed outline of a proposed document recommending the development and
implementation of a WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and
related protocols. 27 The proposal initially met with substantial resistance from
most WHO officials, who instead advocated a non-binding code of conduct
or, alternatively, a treaty adopted under the auspices of the United Nations
rather than WHO. 28 Convinced that a non-binding code of conduct on tobacco
control would be ineffective and that WHO was a more appropriate forum
than the United Nations for the negotiation of a global public health treaty,
Professors Taylor and Roemer did not alter their original recommendation.29
They submitted a final version of their manuscript to WHO's Head of
Tobacco Control on August 23, 1995.30 Nine months later, the WHA finally
adopted a resolution calling for the development of a framework convention
and related protocols that would encourage States Parties to move
progressively toward the adoption of comprehensive national tobacco control
policies and jointly 3address aspects of the tobacco epidemic that transcend
national boundaries.3 '
Three years later, after considerable political maneuvering and the
election of Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland as WHO's Director-General, the WHA
unanimously adopted a resolution that formalized the process for concluding a
framework convention on tobacco control. Fifty nations, including the five
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and major tobacco growing
and exporting countries, pledged their support. 33 The resolution established a
working group to prepare a text of proposed draft elements and an
intergovernmental negotiating body to draft and negotiate the proposed
agreement. 34 In May 2000, the working group submitted its final report to the
WHA, which passed a resolution launching formal political negotiations. 35
The negotiations began in Geneva in October 2000 and concluded in March
2003. On May 21, 2003, the 192 Member States of the WHA adopted the
FCTC by consensus. As of January 8, 2004, eighty-five countries had signed
the treaty, and five countries-Fiji, Malta, Norway, Seychelles, and Sri
26. An International Strategy for Tobacco Control, WHA Res. 48.11, 48th Ass., 12th plen.
mtg., Annex 1, Agenda Item 19, para. 3(1), WHO Doc. WHA48NR/12 (1995).
27. Telephone Interview with Allyn Taylor, supra note 25.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. See also Taylor & Roemer, supra note 23.
31. See WHA Res. 49.17, supra note 23. The WHO's authority to draft such an agreement
derives from Article 19 of its Constitution. See WHO CONST., art. 19. Until the drafting of the FCTC,
this authority had never been invoked.
32. See Towards a WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHA Res. 52.18,
52nd Ass., 9th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 13, WHO Doc. WHA52/EB 103/5 (1999) (urging and promoting
work related to the FCTC and outlining a timeline for its development).
33. See Taylor & Bettcher, supra note 22, at 923.
34. See WHA Res. 52.18, supra note 32, art. 1.
35. See Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHA Res. 53.16, 53rd Ass., 8th plen.
mtg., Agenda Item 12.1, WHO Doe. A53NR/8 (2000).
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Lanka-had ratified it.36 The FCTC will enter into force ninety days after
forty countries ratify it.
37
The WHA's decision to adopt a framework convention, which typically
establishes broadly stated goals, resulted primarily from the formidable
political obstacles that could have prevented a global consensus on the more
onerous commitments normally embodied in a conventional treaty. 38 States
are generally amenable to signing onto a framework convention because they
incur minimal obligations by doing so; states become bound by more specific
commitments embodied in subsequently negotiated protocols only if they
make a separate decision to do so. 9 The perceived economic dependence of
some 120 nations, including ninety developing countries, on tobacco
production for employment and revenue made their governments especially
unlikely to favor a treaty without assurances of an alternative source of
income. 40 The predictable opposition of the tobacco industry was also
expected to undermine support for a treaty.4' Taking these and other political
factors into account, Professors Taylor and Roemer recommended an
incremental form of international standard-setting.
42
The FCTC recommends that States Parties undertake a variety of
national initiatives targeted to reduce the demand for and the supply of
tobacco products within their territories. In particular, States Parties are
encouraged to adopt appropriate price and tax measures, protect the public
from exposure to secondhand smoke, require manufacturers and exporters to
disclose information about the contents of tobacco products, undertake public
awareness campaigns on tobacco control, promote cessation of tobacco use
and adequate treatment for tobacco dependence, enact prohibitions on sales of
tobacco products to minors, provide economically viable alternatives to
tobacco cultivation and sales, and effectively regulate packaging, labeling,
36. See Tobacco Free Initiative, Updated Status of the WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, http://www.who.int/tobacco/fctc/signingsceremony/countrylist/en (last visited Jan. 8,
2004).
37. See FCTC, supra note 24, art. 36(1).
38. See Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy, supra note 25, at 259, 296-97.
39. See Daniel Bodansky, The Framework Convention/Protocol Approach, in FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL TECHNICAL BRIEFING SERIES 17-18, WHO Doc.
WHO/NCD/TFI/99.1 (1999).
40. See Taylor & Roemer, supra note 23, para. 14. Economic analyses undertaken by the
World Bank demonstrate that the long-term social and health costs of nicotine addiction far outweigh
the short-term economic benefits derived from tobacco cultivation and sales. The relevant long-term
costs include medical care, loss of productivity and earnings as a result of tobacco-related illnesses and
death, malnutrition resulting from the diversion of scarce family income to buy tobacco products,
environmental degradation caused by pesticides and firewood used to grow and cure tobacco, and fires
caused by lit cigarettes and matches. WORLD BANK, TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY, supra note 12, at 10;
WORLD BANK, CURBING THE EPIDEMIC, supra note 15, at 8-10; Press Release, WHO, supra note 15.
41. See Taylor & Roemer, supra note 23, para. 14.
42. See id. paras. 20, 90, 91. This approach was patterned on successful strategies that
intemational organizations had previously adopted in the areas of human rights and environmental
protection. Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy, supra note 25, at 259, 286-87. Alternatively,
Taylor and Roemer had proposed that WHO should initially work toward the promulgation of a U.N.
General Assembly resolution. Such a resolution, while non-binding, could have clarified the scope of
agreement among governments about appropriate tobacco control policies and laid a foundation for the
eventual adoption of a global regulatory regime. However, the time and effort involved in cultivating
support for a General Assembly resolution might have unnecessarily postponed the start of FCTC
negotiations. See Taylor & Roemer, supra note 23, paras. 90, 92-93, 96.
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advertising, promotion, sponsorship, and illegal trade in tobacco products.43
The establishment of uniform or minimum global standards is intended to
reduce the incidence of such cross-border problems as smuggling and
advertising leakages through foreign television broadcasts, print media, and
the Internet.44 In a further effort to ensure that the tobacco industry is not able
to exploit markets with weak legislation or enforcement capabilities, the
FCTC emphasizes the importance of the transfer of technical, scientific, and
legal expertise and technology, as well as financial assistance, to developing
country governments and governments with transitional economies, and the
need to develop economically viable alternatives to tobacco production.45 The
source of financial assistance which may be required by developing country
governments and governments with transitional economies was a subject of
much controversy during the negotiations 46 and remains to be determined by
the Conference of the Parties.
Following the adoption of the FCTC, then-WHO Director General
Brundtland hailed the treaty as a "historic moment in global public health. ' 47
The FCTC negotiations encouraged many governments to reevaluate their
domestic tobacco control policies and provided opportunities for information
sharing, coordination, and consensus-building among governments on global
best practices.48 They also created opportunities for increased contact, with
varying degrees of success and formality, between governments and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), which maintained an active presence at
all the negotiating sessions. The NGOs formed the Framework Convention
Alliance (FCA), a coalition of more than 180 groups from over seventy
countries. The FCA members coordinated their interventions, providing daily
issue briefings for FCTC delegates, publishing a daily newsletter, and
lobbying informally between sessions.50 The negotiation process also catalyzed
the formation of vibrant national coalitions of tobacco control advocates in
Bangladesh, India, and the Philippines, 51 which may improve the likelihood
that their governments will ratify the FCTC expeditiously.
43. FCTC, supra note 24, arts. 6-17.
44. See id. pmbl.
45. Id. arts. 4(3), 22, 26. The need for economically viable alternatives to tobacco production
will not be immediate because even the most comprehensive tobacco control policies result in gradual
declines in demand for tobacco products and employment. Moreover, tobacco taxes can be increased to
compensate for some losses in government revenue. See Economics of Tobacco Control, Working
Group of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 1st mtg., at 8-9, WHO Doc.
A/FCTC/WG1/2 (1999), http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/wgl/elt2.pdf; WHO, FACT SHEET No. 155,
TOBACCO EPIDEMIC: MUCH MORE THAN A HEALTH ISSUE (1997).
46. Many developing countries and countries with economies in transition favored the
establishment of a global trust fund, which most developed countries opposed. Telephone Interview with
Allyn Taylor, supra note 25.
47. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: The Road Behind, the Road Ahead,
DAILY NEWS: 12TH WORLD CONFERENCE ON TOBACCO OR HEALTH, Aug. 3-8, 2003, at 4.
48. R. Hammond & M. Assunta, The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control:
Promising Start, Uncertain Future, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 241, 241 (2003).
49. Id.; Mackay, supra note 25, at 551.
50. The FCA was established by the U.S.-based Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids in
consultation with Action on Smoking and Health-London, and with co-funding from the American Lung
Association.
51. See Hammond & Assunta, supra note 48, at 241.
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The high level of detail embodied in the FCTC is a testament to the
persistent efforts of developing country governments to prevent a handful of
developed countries that opposed the treaty-including the United States,
Germany, and Japan-from watering down its provisions. 52 The opposition of
these countries to numerous key provisions, including advertising restrictions
and minimum size requirements for warning labels on cigarette packages,
53
reflects a desire to safeguard the interests of the tobacco industry.
54
Although the FCTC provides countries with the building blocks to enact
comprehensive tobacco control legislation, FCA representatives have
expressed concern that many of the measures enumerated in the treaty are not
55 56mandatory. Moreover, the existing implementation machinery is weak. At
present, the primary mechanism for monitoring the conduct of States Parties
to the FCTC is a system of periodic national reporting. The treaty sets forth
general guidelines for the content of reports from governments, which must
address measures taken at the national level to implement the FCTC,
constraints or barriers encountered in the course of implementation, measures
taken to overcome such constraints or barriers, and information on financial
and technical assistance provided or received for tobacco control activities.
57
States Parties are also required to provide certain types of information
gathered in the course of their implementation efforts. 5
52. See id.
53. See Clare Nullis, Tobacco Treaty Agreed Despite US., German, Some Asian Objections,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 1, 2003; Marc Wolfensberger, WHO Adopts Tobacco Control Text; US.,
Germany May Not Ratify, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 1, 2003. The U.S. negotiators repeatedly asserted that they
could not agree to the advertising ban and warning label requirements on the grounds that the
requirements would would violate the free speech principles embodied in the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Although it is well established that a comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising
reduces tobacco consumption far more effectively than advertising restrictions do, the FCTC includes an
exception for nations with such constitutional constraints. See FCTC, supra note 24, art. 13(3)-(4);
Henry Saffer, Tobacco Advertising and Promotion, in TOBACCO CONTROL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
215-236 (Prabhat Jha & Frank Chaloupka eds., 2000) (summarizing empirical research from 102
countries demonstrating that a comprehensive set of tobacco advertising bans can reduce tobacco
consumption, while a limited set of advertising bans will have minimal effect); Press Release, Nat'l
Council Against Smoking, Tobacco Treaty Triumph for Developing Countries & WHO (Mar. 3, 2003)
(on file with The Yale Journal of International Law) (noting that both WHO and the World Bank have
concluded that tobacco advertising restrictions do not work because they enable the industry to shift its
advertising budget from restricted to unrestricted media).
54. The tobacco industry has repeatedly criticized the FCTC as a "one size fits all" approach
to tobacco control that improperly encroaches on the authority of sovereign states. See, e.g., British
American Tobacco, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at
http://www.bat.com/oneweb/sites/uk__3mnfen.nsf/0/6d5 11 f5596943d4b80256bf400033148?OpenDocu
ment (last visited Dec. 14, 2003); Japan Tobacco International, Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, at http://www.jti.com/english/industryregulation/who.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
55. See Hammond & Assunta, supra note 48, at 241. See also FCTC, supra note 24, art. 6
(specifying that States Parties' obligations to impose price and tax measures intended to reduce tobacco
demand are "[w]ithout prejudice to the sovereign right of the Parties to determine and establish their
taxation policies"), art. 9 (rendering States Parties' obligations to regulate the contents of tobacco
products subject to the approval of competent national authorities), art. 13 (rendering States Parties'
obligations to ban all tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship subject to their constitutions or
constitutional principles).
56. Telephone interview with Allyn Taylor, supra note 25.
57. See FCTC, supra note 24, art. 21 (1)(a)-(c).
58. See id. art. 21(1)(d)-(e). Specifically, States Parties are required to provide publicly
available scientific, technical, socioeconomic, commercial, and legal information as well as information
regarding practices of the tobacco control industry and the cultivation of tobacco; taxation rates for
tobacco products and corresponding trends in tobacco consumption; measures taken at the national level
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The level of states' compliance with their treaty obligations varies based
on their perceived national interests. 59 National reporting systems are intended
to subject governments to public scrutiny with the goal of assisting them in
implementing their international obligations and, where necessary, generating
moral pressure to comply with applicable norms.60 The reporting requirements
embodied in the FCTC may fall short of these goals because they do not
ensure that states' reports will be comprehensive or objective. Moreover, the
body charged with evaluating states' reports, the Conference of the Parties,
6
'
is comprised of government officials whose susceptibility to political
pressures may undermine their commitment to tobacco control. In cases where
states' reports are incomplete, the Conference is not explicitly required to
solicit supplemental information from independent sources. 62 Even where
States Parties willingly disclose aspects of non-compliance with their treaty
obligations, they are not assured of an opportunity to engage in dialogue with
the Conference-or with each other-regarding effective, context-specific
strategies to overcome existing impediments to implementation. Although the
Conference is required to issue regular reports regarding the status of the
FCTC's implementation by particular countries, 63 the treaty lacks follow-up
mechanisms to monitor States Parties' compliance with any recommendations
that may be included in such reports.
Pressure on States Parties to comply with the FCTC may derive not only
from the Conference but also from other States Parties that invoke the treaty's
dispute resolution procedures. If a dispute arises among States Parties
concerning the interpretation or application of the FCTC, the States Parties
must initially make a good faith attempt to resolve it through negotiation or
another non-adversarial means.64 If the dispute remains unresolved, the
concerned States Parties may submit it to ad hoc arbitration in accordance
to ban or restrict tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship; expenditures by the tobacco industry
on advertising, promotion, and sponsorship not yet prohibited; cross-border trade in tobacco products,
and the storage and distribution of tobacco products held or moving under suspension of taxes or duties
within their jurisdictions; health effects of consumption of tobacco products and exposure to secondhand
smoke; and relevant legislation, regulations and jurisprudence. See id. arts. 6(3), 13(2), 13(3), 13(4)(d),
15(5), 19(2), 20.
59. See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 25-26 (1979)
(affirming that national interests can serve as a limitation on the enforcement of international law).
60. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 229-30 (1995) (asserting that a process
of review and assessment of a government's performance can prompt treaty compliance by damaging its
reputation as a member of the international community and limiting its ability to participate in the
international policymaking process); Bodansky, supra note 39, at 23 (noting that national reporting
allows states to benefit from each other's experiences, promotes transparency, and generates pressure on
states by holding them up to domestic and international scrutiny).
61. See FCTC, supra note 24, art. 23(5)(d).
62. To facilitate access to independent information, the International Labour Organization
and certain other international institutions have supplemented state reporting requirements with an
"auditing" process that enables the supervisory body to verify information provided by states. See Allyn
L. Taylor, Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an International Strategy To Advance
Human Rights and Public Health, 25 Am. J.L. & MED. 479, 518-24 (1999). See also Taylor & Roemer,
supra note 23, paras. 82-83 (proposing the incorporation of an analogous process into an international
instrument for tobacco control).
63. FCTC, supra note 24, art. 23(5)(d).
64. Id. art. 27(1).
2004]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29: 209
65
with procedures to be adopted by the Conference. If, however, the States
Parties have not agreed, either when they ratified the treaty or subsequently, to
submit disputes to arbitration, the dispute may persist indefinitely.
In their present form, neither the FCTC's reporting requirements nor its
dispute resolution procedures are likely to influence the conduct of
governments. These implementation mechanisms could be strengthened and
supplemented through the adoption of protocols. 66 Otherwise, FCTC
ratification may prove to be "a fairly cost-free enterprise" that enables States
Parties to improve their public image without undertaking any concrete
commitments to promote tobacco control.67
III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION OF TOBACCO CONTROL
Pending the adoption of stronger implementation mechanisms, the
FCTC suggests an indirect strategy for advancing the objectives of the treaty.
Article 5(5), a standard provision in most framework conventions, requires
States Parties to "cooperate as appropriate with competent international and
regional intergovernmental organizations and other bodies to achieve the
objectives of the Convention and the protocols to which they are Parties."68
Because governments' failures to undertake effective tobacco control
initiatives may violate certain fundamental rights of their citizens, 69
international and regional human rights institutions could play a critical role in
addressing these failures.
Scientific evidence has conclusively established that smoking and the
inhalation of secondhand smoke decrease life expectancy. 70 Even Philip
65. Id. art. 27(2).
66. The negotiation and adoption of protocols is governed by Article 33 of the FCTC. See id.
art. 33. See also Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Letter from Ambassador Luiz Felipe de
Seixas Corr.a, Chair, Intergovernmental Negotiating Body, 6th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 3, at 7, WHO
Doc. A/FCTC/INB6/3 (2003) (characterizing the adoption of the FCTC as "a starting point rather than
the end of a process").
67. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Il1 YALE L.J. 1935,
2020 (2002) (asserting, based on empirical analyses, that treaty ratification can serve to offset pressure
for real changes in state practice in the absence of effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms);
Taylor & Roemer, supra note 23, para. 66.
68. See FCTC, supra note 24, art. 5(5).
69. See Appleberry, supra note 10; Dhooge, supra note 10; Wike, supra note 10. To date,
however, there has been no systematic analysis of the viability of using human rights institutions to
address tobacco-related human rights violations by governments. This Article is intended to fill that gap.
70. See, e.g., Doll et al., supra note 8; FCTC, supra note 24, pmbl. (recognizing that
"scientific evidence has unequivocally established that tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco
smoke cause death, disease and disability"); NAT'L CANCER INST., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., SMOKING AND TOBACCO CONTROL MONOGRAPH No. 11, HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE: THE REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, at ES-2 (1999) (specifying that the causal effects of environmental tobacco smoke include
adverse developmental effects in infants, acute lower respiratory tract infections, asthma induction and
exacerbation, ear infections and chronic respiratory symptoms in children, heart disease morbidity and
mortality, as well as lung and nasal sinus cancer); SCIENTIFIC COMM. ON TOBACCO AND HEALTH, U.K.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, Part Two: Environmental Tobacco Smoking, in REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC
COMMITTEE ON TOBACCO AND HEALTH (1998) (concluding that environmental tobacco smoke increases
the risks of lung cancer by twenty to thirty percent in individuals subject to long-term exposure, and
causes ischaemic heart disease, sudden infant death syndrome, as well as respiratory illness, asthmatic
attacks, and middle ear diseases in children); A.K. Hackshaw, The Accumulated Evidence on Lung
Cancer and Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 980 (1997) (concluding, based on
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Morris has agreed with the "overwhelming medical and scientific consensus
that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema and
other serious diseases in smokers. Smokers are far more likely to develop
serious diseases, like lung cancer, than non-smokers."71 Nicotine addiction has
also been proven to increase malnutrition in developing countries because
scarce family income is diverted to buy tobacco products. 72 Moreover,
according to WHO, the tobacco industry's massive advertising and
promotional campaigns are "direct causes of a substantial number of
unnecessary deaths.",73 Given these realities, governments that have ratified
human rights treaties obligating them to protect the rights of their citizens to
life and health74 should be required to adopt legislative or other measures to
ban tobacco advertising, discourage consumption of tobacco products, and
ensure smoke-free workplaces and public spaces.
Effective tobacco control also implicates the right to freedom of
information. Legal scholars and public health professionals have posited that
this right may be violated when cigarettes are marketed without governmental
assurances that information regarding the adverse health effects of smoking
will be made available. 75 Empirical evidence establishes that many smokers in
low- and middle-income countries are unaware of the risks of smoking.76 The
deceptiveness of the tobacco industry's promotional activities-including the
use of such non-tobacco goods and services as sports sponsorships, clothing,
epidemiological and biochemical evidence, that "breathing other people's tobacco smoke is a cause of
lung cancer"); Sarah Boseley, WHO Links Passive Smoking Cancers, THE GUARDIAN, June 20, 2002,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4444369,00.html (citing a study published in June
2002 by the U.N. International Agency for Research on Cancer, which provided the first definitive
evidence that secondhand smoke increases the risk of lung cancer by about twenty percent and firmly
linked smoking to stomach, liver, cervical, nasal sinus, uterine, and kidney cancer, as well as myeloid
leukemia).
71. Philip Morris USA, Health Issues-Cigarette Smoking and Disease in Smokers,
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/healthissues/cigarette-smokingand disease.asp (last visited Dec. 13,
2003).
72. See TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY: STRATEGIES, SUCCESSES AND SETBACKS, supra note 12,
at 10 (summarizing results of national surveys showing that two to three percent of household
expenditures were attributable to tobacco products in Egypt and India, and indicating that in South
Africa, families in the lowest income quartile which include at least one smoker spent 4.7 percent of
their income on cigarettes in 1995); Debra Efroymson et al., Hungry for Tobacco: An Analysis of the
Economic Impact of Tobacco Consumption on the Poor in Bangladesh, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 212
(2001) (estimating that over 10.5 million malnourished adults in Bangladesh could have an adequate diet
if money spent on tobacco were reallocated for food).
73. WHO EXPERT COMM. ON SMOKING CONTROL, CONTROLLING THE SMOKING EPIDEMIC,
WHO TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES No. 636 (1979). See also U.K. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 18. The
impact of marketing campaigns undertaken by multinational tobacco companies in the developing world
can be monitored relatively easily because the marketing practices utilized by local tobacco companies,
if any, are comparatively small-scale.
74. For a list of these treaties, see supra note 10.
75. Jonathan M. Mann et al., Health and Human Rights, in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 15
(Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999). See also Lynn T. Kozlowski, Harm Reduction, Public Health, and
Human Rights: Smokers Have a Right To Be Informed of Significant Harm Reduction Options, 4
NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 55, 55-60 (2002) (arguing that smokers have a human right to know about
harm reduction options). For a similar argument regarding the right to information necessary for
reproductive health and choice, see Sandra Coliver, The Right to Information Necessary for
Reproductive Health and Choice Under International Law, in THE RIGHT To KNOW: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INFORMATION 70, 70-72 (1995).
76. See Economics of Tobacco Control, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that sixty-one percent of
smokers surveyed in China in 1996 believed that tobacco caused "little or no harm").
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and vacations to advertise tobacco products-may also interfere with
individuals' right to freedom of information. Dr. John Havard, former
Secretary of the British Medical Association, has characterized these tactics as
an effort by the tobacco industry "to persuade millions of people to ignore the
appalling health hazards [of smoking], lulling them into a false sense of
security by associating their products with healthy activities.' '77 Governments
seeking to protect their citizens' right to freedom of information must take
steps to ensure that consumers make informed choices to assume the health
risks of smoking.
The FCTC Preamble specifically references three international human
rights treaties-namely, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC)-with associated implementation bodies that have already
acknowledged the human rights dimension of tobacco control.78 The
jurisprudence of these and other human rights institutions establishes that
tobacco control initiatives implicate the rights to health, 79 life, 80 and freedom
of information. 81 Many of these institutions offer well-developed
77. PETER TAYLOR, THE SMOKE RING: TOBACCO, MONEY & MULTINATIONAL POLITICS 327
(1985).
78. The possibility of including more direct references to the human rights implications of
tobacco control in the FCTC was discussed at various points in the treaty's evolution. See Elements of a
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Working Group on the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, 1st mtg., Prov. Agenda Item 7, paras. 14-15, WHO Doc.
A/FCTC/WGl/6 (1999) (listing as possible points to be included in the FCTC's guiding principles the
right to be fully informed about the health consequences of using tobacco products and/or the addictive
and lethal qualities of tobacco consumption, as well as the right to a tobacco-smoke free environment);
Proposed Draft Elements for a WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Provisional Texts
With Comments of The Working Group, Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, Ist Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 8, at 5, 15, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB1/2
(2000) (discussing the possibility of including a paragraph on the right to health in the FCTC preamble
or elsewhere in the convention and noting that "[d]ue account should be taken of human rights issues" in
the section on treatment of tobacco dependence). The absence of rights language from the FCTC may be
attributable to a variety of factors, including the lack of involvement of organizations with experience in
rights-based approaches in the negotiations, the public health community's relative unfamiliarity with
international human rights law, the controversial status of the right to health under international law, and
the competing concerns of many governments involved in the negotiations about retaining certain
sovereign rights. Telephone Interview with Allyn Taylor, supra note 25.
79. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
Kazakhstan, U.N GAOR, 24th Sess., para. 105, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (2001) (expressing concern about the
status of women's health, including their increasing use of tobacco); General Comment 14-The Right
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., 22d
Sess., paras. 15, 51, U.N. Doe. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) [hereinafter General Comment 14] (recommending
that States Parties recognize the right to health by undertaking information campaigns regarding the
adverse consequences of cigarette smoking and by discouraging the use of tobacco); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: South Africa, 23d Sess., 615th mtg., U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.122 (2000) (expressing concern about the limited availability of programs,
services, and the lack of adequate data in the area of adolescent health, including tobacco use).
80. See, e.g., W6ckel v. Germany, App. No. 32165/96 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (holding that the German legislature's failure to enact more far-reaching
prohibitions on public smoking did not violate the applicant's right to life under Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights in light of other tobacco control measures implemented by the
German government).
81. See, e.g., Osterreichische Schutzgemeinschaft Fur Nichtraucher and Rockenbauer v.
Austria, App. No. 17200/91 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1991), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (holding that
restrictions on advertising that misleads consumers about the health risks of tobacco products are
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implementation machinery-including detailed reporting requirements,
individual petition procedures, and advisory jurisdiction-that could be
constructively used to encourage governments to promote global tobacco
82control . Because the jurisdiction of these institutions is governed by the
treaties that they were established to enforce, they may have authority to
address tobacco-related human rights violations by governments that have yet
to ratify the FCTC. The international human rights community would be
likely to support efforts by tobacco control advocates to increase the use of
such institutions to address tobacco-related human rights violations because,
in addition to advancing the tobacco control agenda, such innovative
advocacy could help to concretize the scope of applicable rights under
international law.
83
Tobacco-related human rights violations often stem from tobacco
companies' activities, although the companies are not directly bound by the
international human rights treaty obligations undertaken by their host
governments. Virtually all international human rights instruments have been
construed to require States Parties to protect human rights by effectively
regulating private entities within their jurisdictions. 84 A leading decision of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights enunciated a due diligence
standard for assessing a state's compliance with its obligations regarding
private actors:
What is decisive is whether a violation of the rights recognized by the Convention has
occurred with the support or the acquiescence of the government, or whether the State
has allowed the act to take place without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those
responsible .... The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human
rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the
appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.... Where the
acts of private parties that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated, those
parties are aided in a sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on
the international plane.
8 5
consistent with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Armenia, 23d
Sess., para. 53, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.110 (2000) (encouraging the State Party to continue its efforts
to provide children with accurate and objective information about tobacco use and to protect them from
harmful misinformation by imposing comprehensive restrictions on tobacco advertising).
82. The only intergovernmental organization specifically referenced in the FCTC is WHO.
The treaty authorizes WHO to convene the first Conference of the Parties, provide secretariat functions
for the FCTC pending the establishment of a permanent secretariat, and facilitate the development of
general guidelines or procedures for defining the collection, analysis, and dissemination of tobacco-
related surveillance data. See FCTC, supra note 24, arts. 20(3)(c), 23(1), 24(2).
83. See Virginia Leary, International Law and Health, Two Approaches: The World Health
Organization's Tobacco Initiative and International Drug Controls, 94 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 193,
195 (2000).
84. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 105, 111, 119-20, 129-
133 (1998); Stephanie Farrior, State Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Actors, 92
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 299, 302 (1998). Certain human rights treaties explicitly acknowledge the
obligation of states to prevent rights infringements by corporations. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 10,
art. 2(e), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16 (requiring states "to take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise").
85. Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 4, paras. 173-74, 177 (1988).
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Other human rights institutions have similarly held that a state's failure to
avail itself of an opportunity to prevent human rights abuses by private entities
gives rise to state responsibility for violations of particular treaty
obligations.86
Under international law, states are also responsible for human rights
violations perpetrated by private companies pursuant to their instructions or
under their direction or control.8 7 In essence, an agency relationship must exist
between the state and the company. Because of the high threshold of
government involvement necessary to substantiate such a relationship, the
requisite facts are more easily demonstrated in the context of a state-owned
company, as compared with a private company. Although the juridical
distinctness of state-owned companies is presumed under international law,88
their involvement in internationally wrongful acts has been deemed to
generate state responsibility where such acts are the direct result of a state's
exercise of its majority ownership or control.89 The increasing privatization of
state-owned tobacco companies throughout the world, which has been
imposed in many cases by the International Monetary Fund as a condition for
86. See, e.g., Soc. and Econ. Rts. Action Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Rts. [sic] v. Nigeria,
Communication No. 155/96, Afr. Comm'n Hum. & Peoples' Rts., paras. 50-55, 64-66 (June 6, 2001),
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/155-96b.html (holding that the Nigerian government's
failure to protect the Ogoni population from the harm caused by the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation-Shell Consortium violated their rights under the African Charter to health, a clean
environment, free disposal of wealth and natural resources, and food); Lrpez Ostra v. Spain, App. No.
16798/90, paras. 51-52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (concluding that the
Spanish government's grant of a government subsidy for construction of a waste treatment plant on
municipal land gave rise to a positive duty to take "reasonable and appropriate measures" to prevent
rights violations stemming from industrial pollution activities); Ominayak & Lubicon Lake Band v.
Canada, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., Annex IX, Supp. No. 40, at 1-30, U.N. Doc.
A/45/40 (1990) (holding that the Canadian government's failure to prevent the destruction of the
families and homes of members of the Lubicon Lake Band through commercial development activities
violated the Band's cultural rights); Case 7615 (Yanomami v. Brazil), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 24, OEA/ser.
L./V.IL66, doc. 10 rev. 1, para. 2(e)-(f), (h)(ix) (1985) (discussing the Brazilian government's violation
of rights to life and health of the Yanomami Indians in permitting construction of a highway that
displaced thousands and permitted the entry of outsiders carrying contagious diseases).
87. See International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. GAOR, 53d
Sess., pt. I, ch. 1, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles]. The
International Law Commission is a standing body of thirty-four independent experts established in 1947
under the auspices of the United Nations. Its mandate is "the promotion of the progressive development
of international law and its codification." G.A. Res. 174(111), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 105, U.N. Doc.
A1519 (1947). Numerous international tribunals have cited the ILC Articles as authoritative expressions
of the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. See, e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 51.
88. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
5); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
112 (2002).
89. See ILC Articles, supra note 87, art. 8; CRAWFORD, supra note 88, at 112-13. See also
Hopu v. France, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 60th Sess., para. 10.3, U.N. Doc. A/52/40 (1997)
(noting that a state-owned company's decision to lease a site for the building of a hotel complex on
ancestral burial grounds of an indigenous population constituted arbitrary interference by the French
government with the right to family and privacy); Hertzberg v. Finland, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
35th Sess., Supp. No. 40, para. 9.1, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1992) (affirming Finland's responsibility for
actions of the Finnish Broadcasting Company based on majority government ownership and exercise of
supervisory responsibilities, but rejecting alleged violations of freedom of expression and information
based on censorship of television and radio programs dealing with homosexuality). Cf X v. Ireland,
App. No. 4125/69 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1971), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (referring to the potential
responsibility of the Irish government for alleged violations of the right to freedom of association by the
Electricity Supply Board, a state-sponsored body).
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the continued receipt of financial assistance, 90 makes this level of involvement
less likely. 91 In countries where governments exercise substantial control over
the activities of private--or privatized-tobacco companies, however, human
rights violations resulting from these activities may be attributable to the
state.
92
IV. USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
To FIGHT BIG TOBACCO
The expanding scope of state responsibility for the activities of private
companies suggests that international human rights institutions could be used
effectively to hold governments accountable for their failures to make
adequate efforts to promote tobacco control within their borders. Recourse to
these institutions would enable the tobacco control community to reclaim the
language of rights from the tobacco industry, which regularly uses this tactic
to promote its own objectives.93 The FCTC provides useful guidance regarding
the types of governmental initiatives that could prevent tobacco-related human
rights violations.
Some international and regional human rights treaty institutions have
devoted considerable attention to the human rights dimension of tobacco
control, while others have made only passing reference. Many have failed to
address this subject at all. Based on the jurisprudence of the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, and the
Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights, I explore the
90. See Privatization of the Thai Tobacco Monopoly, Hearing Before the Senate of Thailand
(July 3, 2002) (testimony of Robert Weissman, Co-Director, Essential Action),
http://www.essentialaction.org/tobacco/thaitestimony.pdf.
91. The majority state-owned tobacco companies at the time of this writing included the
China National Tobacco Corporation, Cubatabaco (Cuba), the Egyptian Tobacco Monopoly, the Iranian
Tobacco Company, Tekel (Turkey), the Thailand Tobacco Monopoly, Tutunul Romanese (Romania),
and Vinataba (Vietnam). Telephone Interview with Ayda Yurekli, Economist, World Bank (Nov. 11,
2003). Japan Tobacco, Inc., which had been two-thirds government-owned, was moving aggressively
toward further privatization at the time of this writing. See Mark A. Levin, Dedicating Tobacco Control
to People's Lives: A Comprehensive Review of Tobacco Policy in Japan, in TOBACCO FREE * JAPAN:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY (forthcoming Feb. 2004) (draft chapter on file with
author). For an excellent analysis of the harmful impact of privatization of state-owned tobacco
companies on public health, see CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, PUBLIC HEALTH AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, VOL. 2: TARIFFS AND PRIVATIZATION (2002), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/
campaign/global/framework/docs/campaignTariffs.pdf.
92. See, e.g., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/ser. L./V./II.96, doc. 10 rev. 1, ch. VIII, at 9 (1997) (encouraging the government of Ecuador to
take steps to prevent rights violations likely to stem from oil exploitation activities planned by several
government-licensed multinational companies and a state-owned corporation); Balmer-Schafroth v.
Switzerland, App. No. 22110/93, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 598 (1997), available at http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/hudoc (finding that Swiss government's issuance of an operating license could provide basis for
attribution of state responsibility for alleged violations of rights to life, physical integrity, and property
by operators of a nuclear power plant).
93. See, e.g., British American Tobacco, supra note 54, at 58 (affirming adults' rights "to
make informed personal choices about a product which is legal everywhere"); Letter from Paul R.
Dilman, Jr., General Manager, Philip Morris Thailand Ltd., to Khun Sudarat Keyuraphan, Minister of
Public Health, Thailand (Feb. 27, 2002) (on file with author) (asserting that Thailand's proposal to
require graphic health warnings on cigarette packages would unnecessarily limit Philip Morris's
constitutional right to communicate with its customers by displaying trademarks and logos).
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different ways that these institutions might be systematically used to hold
states accountable for their complicity in tobacco-related human rights
violations. I conclude this Part by proposing ways in which the
implementation mechanisms employed by these fora could be used to bolster
those embodied in the FCTC.
A. Revitalizing Reporting Requirements: The Experience of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
was established by the U.N. Economic and Social Council in 1987 to assist in
monitoring States Parties' compliance with their obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).9 4
For purposes of global tobacco control, the most significant provision of the
ICESCR is Article 12, which provides the most comprehensive coverage of
the right to health under international human rights law.95 Pursuant to Article
12(1), States Parties "recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." 96 Article 12(2) sets
forth a number of affirmative steps to be taken by States Parties to achieve the
full realization of the right to health, including, in relevant part, provisions for
the reduction of the stillbirth rate and of infant mortality, the healthy
development of the child, the improvement of environmental and industrial
hygiene,97 and the prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic and
occupational diseases.98
The CESCR construes Article 12 to require States Parties to implement
certain tobacco control measures, which are referenced in General Comment
No. 14. 99 In particular, States Parties are encouraged to recognize the right to
health in their national political and legal systems by undertaking
"information campaigns, in particular with respect to... the use of cigarettes,
drugs and other harmful substances."' 100 The CESCR also specifies that a
state's obligation to improve environmental and industrial hygiene includes
discouraging the "use of tobacco, drugs and other harmful substances."' 01 In
addition, General Comment No. 14 provides that a state's failure to take all
necessary measures to safeguard persons within its jurisdiction from
infringements of the right to health by third parties, including corporations,
constitutes a violation of its Article 12 obligations. The specified examples of
94. See Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First Session of the UN. Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1987). The Committee is composed of eighteen
independent experts, chosen with regard to equitable geographical distribution, who serve in their
personal capacities. See E.S.C. Res. 1985/17, U.N. ESCOR, para. B, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85 (1985).
95. See ICESCR, supra note 10, art. 12, 993 U.N.T.S. at 8.
96. Id. art. 12(1).
97. Id. art. 12(2). Similarly, Article 7(b) of the ICESCR guarantees the right to the enjoyment
of safe and healthy working conditions. Id. art. 7(b), 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
98. Id. art. 12(2).
99. See General Comment 14, supra note 79. The CESCR occasionally clarifies the content
of particular rights enumerated in the ICESCR through the publication of authoritative interpretations
known as general comments.
100. Id. para. 13.
101. Id. para. 15.
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such violations include "the failure to discourage production, marketing and
consumption of tobacco."'
0 2
The primary monitoring method available to the CESCR is the review of
periodic reports submitted by States Parties. 10 3 In an effort to ensure that these
reports are sufficiently comprehensive, the CESCR promulgated guidelines
regarding form and content' t 4 The CESCR has invited the submission of
relevant documentation from U.N. specialized agencies, other U.N. bodies,
and NGOs to permit independent verification of information received from
States Parties.1°5 The review process includes a formal session where the full
CESCR and representatives of each State Party engage in a "constructive
dialogue" on issues generated by the report. 0 6 Following this exchange, the
CESCR publishes Concluding Observations to identify its primary concerns
and offer recommendations for improving the government's compliance with
its treaty obligations.' 0 7 The CESCR has the ability to impose substantial
moral pressure on recalcitrant governments by highlighting treaty violations
during formal constructive dialogue sessions,' °s which are summarized in the
CESCR's Summary Records, and Concluding Observations, which are made
public on the final day of its sessions.1
09
The CESCR's proceedings to date intermittently have addressed tobacco
control. Some governments discussed their tobacco control policies in their
periodic reports even before the CESCR issued General Comment No. 14."'
102. Id. Paragraph 15 could be construed to imply that tobacco products should be banned.
Because tobacco is not currently an illegal drug, this recommendation could undermine the CESCR's
credibility.
103. States Parties to the ICESCR are currently required to report every five years on the
status of their domestic implementation of the treaty provisions, including any factors and difficulties
affecting their compliance. ICESCR, supra note 10, arts. 16(1), 17(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 9; Sandra Coliver
& Alice M. Miller, International Reporting Procedures, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACICE 191 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1999).
104. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-Report on the Fifth Session,
U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 88-110, U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23 (1991).
105. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-Report on the Sixth Session,
U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., 6th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 100, U.N. Doc.
E/1992/23 (1992); Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 473, 496-503 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
106. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-Report on the Eighth Session,
U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., 8th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 15-16, U.N. Doc.
E/1994/23 (1994). The CESCR is explicitly permitted to solicit information from qualified NGOs and
U.N. specialized agencies in preparing for these sessions. See ICESCR, supra note 10, art. 18, 993
U.N.T.S. at 9-10; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-Report on the Sixth Session,
supra note 105, at 100-01.
107. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-Report on the Fifth Session,
supra note 104, at 32-34. The U.N. Economic and Social Council may notify other organs of the United
Nations, their subsidiary organs, and those specialized agencies concerned with furnishing technical
assistance of any matters arising out of States Parties' reports that may warrant intervention. See
ICESCR, supra note 10, art. 22, 993 U.N.T.S at 10.
108. See, e.g., Kamen Sachariew, Promoting Compliance with International Environmental
Legal Standards: Reflections on Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENVT'L L. 31, 42
(1991) (noting that the pressure of public opinion generated through open discussion of reports has the
potential to promote compliance with international rules).
109. See Matthew Craven, The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 463 (Asbjom Eide et al. eds., 2001).
110. See, e.g., U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., 20th Sess., 16th mtg.,
paras. 4, 32, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/SR.16 (1999) (highlighting that due to a WHO report listing
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In addition, CESCR members have used constructive dialogue sessions to
question certain government representatives about the status of particular
tobacco control initiatives, including anti-smoking campaigns, tobacco
advertising bans, and cigarette tax increases."' 1 Following its sessions, the
CESCR has made general recommendations regarding the need for more
effective tobacco information campaigns and the importance of tobacco
advertising restrictions. 
112
Given its openness to receiving information from non-governmental
sources, the CESCR would be likely to welcome substantive input from the
tobacco control community regarding particular governments' roles in
tobacco-related human rights violations, 13 as well as assistance in formulating
relevant monitoring criteria and developing appropriate policy
recommendations. Tobacco control advocates from different regions of the
world could initiate collaboration with the CESCR by drafting a statement
delineating the tobacco control implications of the right to health. Such a
statement should emphasize that a government's failure to require strong
health warnings on cigarette packages, organize public awareness campaigns
regarding the health hazards of tobacco products, or prohibit deceptive
advertising by the tobacco industry interferes with its population's right of
tobacco products as the "single most important factor of the disease burden facing Ireland," the Irish
government instituted a national tobacco control strategy including health education programs, increased
cigarette taxes, and tougher advertising restrictions); Report of Armenia-Addendum to Initial Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Substantive Sess. of
1998, para. 152, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.36 (1998) (citing provisions of Armenian law that prohibit
minors from working in the tobacco industry or other employment that may harm their health or
physical or mental development); Report of Honduras-Addendum to Initial Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Substantive Sess. of 1998, paras. 201, 394, U.N.
Doc. E/1990/5/Add.40 (1998) (asserting increased prevalence of health problems connected with the use
and abuse of tobacco, and noting that the constitution calls for regulation by law of the commercial
advertising of tobacco products); Report of Switzerland-Addendum to Initial Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Substantive Sess. of 1997, para. 610, U.N. Doc.
E/1990/5/Add.33 (1996) (noting that the belief of both the Federal Council and the Federal Office of
Public Health that smoking is harmful to its citizens' health has led to an increase in tobacco warning
labels and the implementation of a comprehensive smoking prevention program).
111. See, e.g., U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., 22d Sess., 8th mtg., U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2000/SR.8 (2000) (discussing Italy's anti-smoking campaigns and justification for
advertising Marlboro tobacco brand on Ferrari cars in Formula One racing competition, which was
broadcast widely on Italian television, in light of tobacco advertising ban); U.N. ESCOR Comm. on
Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., 20th Sess., 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/SR.16 (1999) (discussing
Ireland's willingness to comply with WHO guidelines calling for increased taxes on tobacco products
and implementation of a total advertising ban).
112. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Ukraine, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., 26th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/l/Add.65 (2001) (recommending that the Ukrainian government provide children with accurate
and objective information about tobacco use and discourage public mass media from promoting
consumption of tobacco products); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Poland, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., 18th Sess., 26th mtg.,
U.N. Doe. E/C.12/l/Add.26 (1998) (recommending that the Polish government engage in a large-scale
public information campaign to combat smoking).
113. To ensure that the CESCR and other international human rights institutions will seriously
consider any information submitted, tobacco control advocates may wish to seek training in fact-finding
methodologies employed by well-respected human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch
and Amnesty International.
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access to information-the protection of which, according to General
Comment 14, is a core ICESCR obligation.' 14 The statement might hold
particular interest for the CESCR if it highlighted the promotional tactics
employed by the tobacco industry to target women and children, 1 5 whose
acquisition of accurate health-related information is a priority for the
CESCR. 16 The statement could also expand on the requirements for a healthy
workplace environment by defining it to be smoke-free." 7 Depending on the
CESCR's receptiveness, the statement might serve as a draft for a future
general comment. 1
8
By providing needed technical expertise, the tobacco control community
could also help the CESCR to supplement its existing reporting guidelines
with detailed questions regarding a government's tobacco control policies. 119
Likewise, the tobacco control community could encourage the CESCR to
discuss tobacco-related violations of the right to health during constructive
dialogue sessions. Based on these exchanges, the CESCR-with additional
input from tobacco control advocates, where needed120 -could formulate
country-specific recommendations to address instances of non-compliance. 12 1
In the process, the tobacco control community could expand its advocacy
114. See General Comment 14, supra note 79, paras. 11, 12, 34, 35, 44(d), 47, 50. Ideally,
governments should be urged to adopt comprehensive bans on tobacco advertising rather than partial
restrictions, which have proven to have minimal impact on tobacco use. PAHO, DEVELOPING
LEGISLATION FOR TOBACCO CONTROL 23 (2002).
115. See CLAIRE CHOLLAT-TRAQUET, WHO, WOMEN AND TOBACCO 63-66 (1992); WHO,
TOBACCO AND THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 31-39 (2001).
116. See General Comment 14, supra note 79, paras. 21, 23. This concern is also consistent
with Article 10 of the ICESCR, which calls for special measures of protection for mothers during a
reasonable period before and after childbirth, as well as for children and young persons. See ICESCR,
supra note 10, art. 10(2)-(3), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
117. See General Comment 14, supra note 79, para. 15. According to PAHO, smoke-free
environments promote smoking cessation and prevent smoking initiation "by striking at the heart of the
social acceptability of tobacco." PAHO, supra note 114, at 31-32.
118. For an example of NGO interventions that have contributed to the elaboration and
implementation of ICESCR rights, see Scott Leckie, The Legal Struggle for Housing Rights: One
NGO's Search for the Elusive, 2 BEYOND LAW 75-88 (1992) (noting that the Habitat International
Coalition and the Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions provided significant input to the CESCR on
General Comment 4, which defines the right to adequate housing in very specific terms and provides
concrete benchmarks for assessing implementation efforts by States Parties). General Comment 4 can be
found at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/epcomm4.htm.
119. Notably, the guidelines for reports by States Parties to the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child explicitly request the submission of:
information on legislative and other measures taken to prevent the use by children of alcohol,
tobacco and other substances which may be prejudicial to their health.., and on any evaluation
made of the effectiveness of such measures, together with relevant disaggregated data on the use
by children of such substances.
General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Periodic Reports To Be Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 44, Paragraph 1(b), of the Convention, 13th Sess., 343d mtg., para. 157, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/58 (1996) (emphasis added).
120. Although NGO representatives cannot participate in formal constructive dialogue
sessions, they are permitted to attend. They often submit proposed questions prior to these sessions and
take advantage of the opportunity to suggest appropriate follow-up questions to CESCR members during
breaks. See ALLAN MCCHESNEY, PROMOTING AND DEFENDING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL
RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK 107-08 (2000).
121. By publicizing any written materials they submit to the CESCR, tobacco control NGOs
could generate public debate that might impose additional pressure on governments to improve their
records of compliance. Id. at 103.
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efforts to a potentially useful forum where government representatives would
be compelled to confront its concerns.
B. People's Justice: The Right of Individuals To Petition the U.N. Human
Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights
Certain human rights institutions are competent to consider
communications from individuals who claim to be victims of human rights
violations or entities acting on behalf of such individuals, and to grant
appropriate remedies. The jurisdiction of at least two of these bodies, the U.N.
Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR), encompasses the enforcement of certain core civil and political
rights, including the rights to life, protection from cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment, and freedom of information, all of which are implicated
in tobacco control. Although the HRC has yet to consider the human rights
dimension of tobacco control, its jurisprudence suggests multiple possibilities
for bringing this subject to its attention. By contrast, the ECHR has issued
numerous decisions addressing the human rights consequences of tobacco
control initiatives undertaken by Member States of the European Union. The
populations of victims eligible to submit petitions to each of these fora are
largely distinct, as are the types of relief available to them.
1. U.N. Human Rights Committee
The HRC was established pursuant to Article 28 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to monitor States Parties'
compliance with their obligations under that treaty. 122 The HRC has made
significant contributions to human rights jurisprudence through its decisions,
known as "views," in response to individual communications against States
Parties pursuant to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 123 Although the
HRC's views are neither legally binding nor enforceable, they have prompted
some governments to compensate victims, amend legislation, or establish
122. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 28, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. The HRC is composed of
eighteen nationals of different States Parties to the ICCPR who have recognized competence in human
rights. They are chosen to ensure equitable geographical distribution of membership, and representation
of different forms of civilization and the world's principal legal systems. Although they are nominated
and elected by States Parties to the ICCPR, the members of the HRC serve in their personal capacities.
Id. arts. 28, 31.
123. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 648 (1993) (referring to the adjudication of individual communications under the
Optional Protocol as "one of the most important procedures for the international protection of human
rights") (emphasis omitted). But cf ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM 25
(2001) (noting that the average time between submission of an individual communication to the HRC
and the determination of final views is four years); Murat Metin Hakki, The Silver Anniversary of the
UN Human Rights Committee: Anything To Celebrate?, 6 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 85, 96-97 (2002)
(characterizing the HRC's views as "inept instruments to achieve greater protection of rights by all
states," but conceding that many States Parties to the Optional Protocol have nonetheless given effect to
them).
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local remedies. 24 They have also been reflected with increasing frequency in
the judgments of national courts. 1 25
A victim, group of victims, or their representatives may file an
individual communication with the HRC against States Parties to the First
Optional Protocol. 126 In some cases, the mere possibility that an individual
will become the victim of human rights violations has been sufficient to
render a communication admissible. 127 The state has six months to respond in
writing once a communication is filed with the HRC; the individual has an
additional six weeks to submit a surreply 1 28 Based on the written submissions
received on behalf of the individual and the state, the HRC issues its views
setting forth both its findings of fact and conclusions of law.' 29 The HRC's
views are transmitted to the individual and the targeted state, and published in
the HRC's annual report to the U.N. General Assembly.
t30
Individual communications addressing tobacco-related human rights
violations could be filed against the government of a country where a tobacco
124. See Elizabeth Evatt, The Right to Individual Petition: Assessing Its Operation Before the
Human Rights Committee and Its Future Application to the Women 's Convention on Discrimination, 89
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 225, 229 (1995). Since 1990, the HRC's guidelines for the preparation of
reports by States Parties have required a section regarding actions taken in response to individual
communications. In an effort to ensure more consistent implementation of the HRC's views, the HRC
also appointed a Special Rapporteur for the Follow-Up of Views. NOWAK, supra note 123, at 711-12.
Despite these steps, the HRC has not been consistently able to follow up on its recommendations. See
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 740-41 (2d ed. 2000).
Cf Alfred de Zayas, The Examination of Individual Complaints by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS 73 (Gudmundur Alfedsson et al. eds.,
2001) (referring to the HRC's examination of States Parties' reports as "unwieldy, routine, repetitious
and overlapping").
125. See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401,430-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that
rulings of the HRC on individual communications establish certain essential principles regarding the
content of the rights to freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression); In re Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 2001 Austl. High Ct. LEXIS 4, 54-57 (2001) (noting that
Australia's common law will be influenced by the HRC's jurisprudence by virtue of Australia's having
signed the ICCPR). See also Markus G. Schmidt, Follow-up Procedures to Individual Complaints and
Periodic State Reporting Mechanisms, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS,
supra note 124, at 201 (noting that national courts are increasingly cognizant of HRC decisions).
126. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1996), 999 U.N.T.S. 302
[hereinafter ICCPR Optional Protocol]. By contrast with the ECHR, an NGO cannot submit a
communication to the HRC. See Disabled & Handicapped Persons v. Italy, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts.
Comm., 21st Sess., paras. 5, 6.2, 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) (declaring communication
inadmissible for lack of personal standing to the extent that it originated from a non-governmental
organization rather than an individual victim of an alleged violation of the ICCPR). However, a close
family member has been permitted to file a communication on behalf of an individual who could not do
so. See Hakki, supra note 123, at 92.
127. See Toonen v. Australia, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., paras. 8.2, 8.6, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (finding arbitrary interference with author's right to privacy based
on prospect of enforcement of Tasmanian Criminal Code provisions criminalizing various forms of
sexual contact between men); Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 36th
Sess., paras. 9.2, 10.1, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (finding a violation of the rights of Mauritian wives to
family life and non-discrimination based on the future possibility of their alien husbands' deportation
pursuant to the national immigration law).
128. See ICCPR Optional Protocol, supra note 126, art. 4(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 302; Si.n
Lewis-Anthony, Treaty-Based Procedures for Making Human Rights Complaints Within the UN System,
in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 103, at 47.
129. - See Lewis-Anthony, supra note 128, at 48.
130. See ICCPR Optional Protocol, supra note 126, arts. 5(4), 6, 999 U.N.T.S. at 303.
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company is operating or against the government of the country where the
company's headquarters are based.131 Such a communication could be based
on alleged violations of the "inherent right to life" under Article 6(1) of the
ICCPR.132 The HRC has emphasized that this right should be broadly
construed and that states are required to adopt positive measures to protect it.
In particular, the HRC has recommended that "it would be desirable for States
Parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase
life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate . . .
epidemics." 133 The travaux priparatoires to the ICCPR affirm that such
measures should include regulation of the behavior of "private persons,"134 a
term which has been construed to include corporations.
Given the overwhelming evidence that smoking and the inhalation of
secondhand smoke cause various types of cancer and other life-threatening
illnesses,' 36 States Parties to the ICCPR should be required to adopt legislative
or other measures' 37 to decrease consumption of tobacco products 38 and
ensure smoke-free workplaces and public spaces. This could be achieved
through the filing of individual communications, on behalf of smokers and
non-smokers, against States Parties to the Optional Protocol with weak
131. Cf. Lewis-Anthony, supra note 128, at 43.
132. Article 6(1) of the ICCPR provides: "Every human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." ICCPR, supra note
10, art. 6(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. Pursuant to Article 4(2), no derogations from Article 6 are permitted.
Id. art. 4(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
133. General Comment 6, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 16th Sess., 378th mtg., para. 5,
U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/2 1/Add. 1 (1982). In the course of examining reports by States Parties, the HRC has
often sought information regarding measures taken by states to reduce infant mortality and increase life
expectancy. See U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 19th Sess., 441st mtg., para. 36, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR 441 (1983) (questioning whether the French delegation had taken any efforts to reduce
infant mortality); U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 18th Sess., 431st mtg., para. 21, U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/SR.431 (1983) (linking the right to life with hunger, disease, and malnutrition, while also
questioning the infant mortality rate in Peru); U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 11 th Sess., 257th mtg.,
para. 38, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.257 (1980) (stressing the importance of protecting public health of
young people in Italy); U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 9th Sess., 199th mtg., para. 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.199 (1980) (noting that the HRC sought information regarding actions that the Iraqi
legislature had taken with regard to life expectancy and birthrate in Iraq); U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts.
Comm., 7th Sess., at 12-13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/I/Add.44 (1979) (providing the HRC with statistics
regarding the average life expectancy at birth as well as infant mortality rates in Hungary); U.N. GAOR
Hum. Rts. Comm., 4th Sess., at 4-5, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/1/Add.31 (1978) (reporting measures the
Syrian Arab Republic has taken to reduce infant mortality and to improve life expectancy, including
vaccination programs and other health and environmental services).
134. See MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 120 (1987). See also CLAPHAM, supra note
84; Farrior, supra note 84.
135. See supra notes 84-86.
136. See supra note 70.
137. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-74 (requiring States Parties "to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in
the present Covenant").
138. These measures should include the imposition of tobacco taxes at levels that decrease
consumption and the progressive elimination of tobacco advertising and promotion. PAHO, supra note
114, at 3. However, a total ban on smoking would be unenforceable. See Economics of Tobacco Control,
supra note 45, at 7. Many tobacco control advocates oppose such a ban. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Warner et
al., The Emerging Market for Long-Term Nicotine Maintenance, 278 J. AM. MED. ASs'N 1087, 1090
(1997) (advocating that a new nicotine policy should acknowledge the "individual dignity [of victims of
nicotine addiction], the difficulty many would have in being forced to forgo nicotine, and the
opportunity to continue consuming nicotine should they so desire").
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tobacco regulatory regimes.' 39 Claims on behalf of non-smokers based on the
absence of legislation requiring smoke-free workplaces and public spaces may
be easier to prove than claims on behalf of smokers, whose injuries are
commonly perceived to stem from their own conduct. However, because
smokers in the developing world are generally unaware of the risks associated
with tobacco use, 140 their conduct should not give rise to an assumption of risk
defense or diminish the level of state responsibility for resultant violations of
the right to life.
Individual communications on behalf of non-smokers seeking to
minimize their exposure to secondhand smoke could also be based on their
right to protection from "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" under Article 7 of the ICCPR.141 The HRC has characterized
"treatment," which was defined by the drafters to be broader in scope than
"punishment,"' 142 as "cruel, inhuman or degrading" in only a few cases, nearly
all of which involved mistreatment of prisoners in detention. 43 For example,
the HRC has construed "degrading treatment" to include a broad spectrum of
arbitrary tRractices intended to humiliate prisoners and make them feel
insecure. Involuntary exposure to secondhand smoke arguably falls into this
category.'45 Outside the detention context, a government should be held
accountable for its failure to implement a ban on smoking in workplaces and
public spaces, where non-smokers are compelled to inhale secondhand smoke
involuntarily.
Effective tobacco control also implicates the obligations of governments
under Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, which protects the right to freedom of
information. 146 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and
Expression has independently recognized this right and has affirmed the
obligation of private bodies to disclose information relating to crucial public
139. The hallmarks of a strong tobacco regulatory regime include broad restrictions on
tobacco advertising and promotion, high tobacco taxes, strong warnings on tobacco packages, strict
limits on smoking in public spaces and workplaces, tight controls on tobacco sales to minors, organized
antismoking efforts, and effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. See Sugarman, supra note
5, at 261; Taylor & Roemer, International Strategy for Tobacco Control, supra note 23, at 41.
140. See WORLD BANK, supra note 15, at 30 ("People's knowledge of the health risks of
smoking appears to be partial at best, especially in low and middle-income countries where information
about these hazards is limited."); Prabhat Jha et al., T'he Economic Rationale for Intervention in the
Tobacco Market, in TOBACCO CONTROL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 53, at 153, 156-57
(attributing lack of awareness of the health hazards of smoking in the developing world to low education
levels and governments' failures to regulate tobacco advertising and promotion).
141. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
142. See BOSSUYT, supra note 134, at 150.
143. See NOWAK, supra note 123, at 134-135.
144. See id. at 133 (citing Conteris v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 25th Sess.,
para. 9.2, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/25/D/139/1983 (1985), which found that repeated solitary confinement,
subjection to cold, and persistent relocation to a different cell constituted "degrading treatment"). Such a
finding may be based on an objective standard or an individual's perception of the treatment to which he
is subjected. Id.
145. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a state prisoner's involuntary exposure to
secondhand smoke that poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health could
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney,
509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (remanding case for further hearings on these allegations).
146. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR provides for the "freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information, and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form
of art, or any other media." ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
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interests, including health. 147 On the theory that Article 19(2) of the ICCPR
obligates governments to ensure that their citizens make informed choices to
assume the health risks of smoking, individual communications could be filed
against those States Parties to the Optional Protocol that have failed to
undertake adequate tobacco control education measures. At a minimum, these
measures should include the implementation of regulations requiring detailed
or graphic health warnings on cigarette packages and the organization of
public awareness campaigns. Although the effectiveness of particular
initiatives may vary depending on relevant geographical and cultural
considerations, the HRC could establish a useful precedent by affirming that
governments have a positive obligation to disclose the risks inherent in using
tobacco products. The burden of disclosure should be higher in cases where
tobacco advertising targets particularly vulnerable groups such as women and
children.
The tobacco industry regularly seeks to defeat advertising restrictions on
the grounds that they would infringe its right to freedom of expression.
148
However, Article 19(2) is subject to the exceptions set forth in Article 19(3).
Article 19(3) provides that the exercise of the rights covered by Article 19(2)
carries "special duties and responsibilities," including compliance with certain
restrictions provided by law that are necessary for the protection of public
health. 149 Legal scholars have construed Article 19(3) to embody the "general
duty to present information truthfully, accurately, and impartially."'' 0 Insofar
as the tobacco industry's advertisements or promotional activities are
misleading or deceptive, 151 restrictions on these activities would be consistent
with Article 19(3). 152
147. Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess., paras. 42, 44, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/63
(2000).
148. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 84 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D. Mass. 2000) (rejecting
claims by Lorillard Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Philip Morris Incorporated,
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, and United States Tobacco Company that Massachusetts'
proposed tobacco product advertising and promotion regulations violated the First Amendment, with the
exception of point-of-sale regulations); ASAF BITrON ET AL., TOBACCO INDUSTRY ATTEMPTS To
SUBVERT EUROPEAN UNION TOBACCO ADVERTISING LEGISLATION 18-40 (Ctr. for Tobacco Control
Research & Educ., Univ. of Cal., EU Paper 2002), http://repositories.cdlib.org/ctcre/tcpmi/EU2002
(summarizing the tobacco industry's efforts to defeat a proposed European advertising ban based in part
on right to freedom of expression).
149. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 19(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
150. See NOWAK, supra note 123, at 351; BOSSUYT, supra note 134, at 392, 398-99; Karl Josef
Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 219 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
151. For example, the use of deceptive descriptors such as "light" and "mild" falsely implies a
reduced health risk attributable to low-tar or nicotine requirements. See generally MINISTERIAL
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON TOBACCO CONTROL, PUTTING AN END TO DECEPTION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL EXPERT PANEL ON CIGARETTE DESCRIPTORS (2002), available at
www.ncth.ca/CCTCweb.nsf (fmding no convincing evidence of health benefits resulting from cigarettes
marked as "light" or "mild"); NAT'L CANCER INST., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING
AND TOBACCO CONTROL MONOGRAPH No. 13, RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SMOKING CIGARETTES WITH
Low MACHINE-MEASURED YIELDS OF TAR AND NICOTINE (2001), http://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/tcrb/
monographs/13/m 13.preface.pdf (finding that switching to low-tar/low-nicotine cigarettes may provide
smokers with a false sense of reduced risk because the actual amount of tar and nicotine consumed may
be equal to or greater than a higher yield brand).
152. See NOWAK, supra note 123, at 357-58 (noting that the restriction of tobacco advertising
by States Parties to the ICCPR may be justified based on the public health exception to the right to
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HRC members, like CESCR members, may lack the technical
competence required to assess the tobacco industry's truthfulness in
advertising or the effectiveness of measures taken by states to counter
deceptive advertising practices. Thus, individual communications should be
comprehensively documented with relevant scientific and other evidence.
53
By ensuring that such information is presented to the HRC, tobacco control
advocates could facilitate the development of international standards that
bolster their advocacy efforts before national courts and legislatures.
2. European Court of Human Rights
The ECHR is authorized to render decisions on petitions from any
person, NGO, or group claiming to be or to represent the victim of a violation
by a State Party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of any of the rights protected by that
instrument. 54 The ECHR has issued instructive jurisprudence in response to
individual petitions alleging violations of the rights to life, respect for private
and family life, and freedom to receive information based on various aspects
of States Parties' tobacco control legislation.155 While affirming the human
rights dimension of tobacco production, marketing, and consumption, the
ECHR's decisions accord a "margin of appreciation" 1 56 to national
governments regarding the precise parameters of an effective tobacco
regulatory regime. Its judgments, with which States Parties to the European
Convention are legally bound to comply,' 57 are significant not only for their
effect on the conduct of European governments, 5 8 but also for their potential
freedom of expression and information); Partsch, supra note 150, at 219 (stating that false or misleading
expressions about drugs might be regulated to protect public health).
153. Article 5(1) of the Optional Protocol appears to limit the evidence available to the HRC
to written information supplied by the individual who files the communication and the concerned State
Party. In practice, however, informal NGO communications are welcomed by particular HRC members.
Moreover, HRC members cannot be expected to disregard any independent knowledge they may have of
the factual or legal situation in a particular state. See NOWAK, supra note 123, at 691-93.
154. European Convention, supra note 10, art. 34, 155 E.T.S. at 5. Although the ECHR is also
authorized to render decisions on disputes between States Parties regarding alleged breaches of the
European Convention, states have generally been reluctant to initiate such proceedings. See European
Convention, supra note 10, art. 33, 155 E..T.S. at 5; Soren C. Prebensen, Inter-State Complaints Under
Treaty Provisions, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS, supra note 124, at
554-55.
155. These rights are protected by Articles 2, 8, and 10, respectively, of the European
Convention. European Convention, supra note 10, arts. 2, 8, 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224, 230. To date, the
tobacco-related jurisprudence of the ECHR has not addressed Article 3, which prohibits inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. See European Convention, supra note 10, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at
224.
156. "Margin of appreciation" refers to the discretion accorded to States Parties to decide on
particular measures necessary to execute the ECHR's judgments. RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH
TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 273-74 (2000).
157. See European Convention, supra note 10, art. 46(1), 155 E.T.S. at 8. Regarding
mechanisms for enforcing ECHR judgments, see ELIZABETH LAMBERT-ABDELGAWARD, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). By
contrast, the decisions of the CESCR and the HRC are not legally binding.
158. See Robert Blackburn & Jorg Polakiewicz, Preface by the Editors, in FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS IN EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 1950-
2000, at ix (Robert Blackburn & Jorg Polakiewicz eds., 2001).
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impact on the reasoning of other international human rights institutions and
national courts throughout the world.159
The decision of the European Commission on Human Rights16 in
Wdckel v. Germany provides guidance regarding the scope of States Parties'
affirmative obligations to protect non-smokers from the risks of exposure to
secondhand smoke. 61 In that case, the European Commission declared
inadmissible a German citizen's request for an order requiring the German
legislature to enact more far-reaching prohibitions on smoking in public
pursuant to Articles 2112 and 8 " of the European Convention. 164 Noting that
the German government had already undertaken a public information
campaign on the health risks of smoking, imposed restrictions on tobacco
advertising, and prohibited smoking in certain public areas, the European
Commission held that the applicant's rights to life and to respect for private
and family life had not been violated.165 This decision establishes that Articles
2 and 8 impose certain affirmative obligations on States Parties to protect non-
smokers' rights through public education and legislation. However, the
Commission ultimately deferred to Germany, which has been a staunch and
consistent ally of the tobacco industry, 166emphasizing that the implementation
159. See Coliver, supra note 75, at 44 (noting that decisions of the European Court are often
granted significance in other regions of the world); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40
VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1109-10 (2000) (noting that the South African Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
of Zimbabwe, and the British Privy Council sitting as the Constitutional Court of Jamaica have relied on
ECHR decisions). For examples of decisions of non-European fora that have looked to ECHR
jurisprudence, see Cooley v. Granholm, 291 F.3d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing an ECHR case about
euthanasia); Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of
Journalism, Adv. Op. OC-5/83, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 5, para. 46 (1985) (discussing ECHR
decisions regarding permissible restrictions on freedom of expression) [hereinafter Compulsory
Membership].
160. Prior to the entry into force on November 1, 1998 of Protocol No. 11 of the European
Convention, cases submitted to the ECHR were handled initially by the European Commission on
Human Rights, which ruled on admissibility, established the facts, and promoted friendly settlement. See
A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 127-30, 149-51 (1996).
161. Wdckel v. Germany, App. No. 32165/96 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/hudoc.
162. See European Convention, supra note 10, art. 2(l), 213 U.N.T.S. at 224. ("Everyone's
right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided
by law.").
163. Article 8 provides:
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ....
2) There shall be no interference with a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society...
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
Id. art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
164. See Wockel v. Germany.
165. Id. In Wockel, the applicant's claim under Article 8 derived from an alleged violation of
his right to private life. Id. However, Article 8 could also provide the basis for claims of violations of the
right to family life by individuals whose family members have died from tobacco-related illnesses.
166. See, e.g., Eryn Brown, The World Health Organization Takes On Big Tobacco, FORTUNE,
Sept. 17, 2001, at 117; Frances Williams, Progress Made on Tobacco Control Treaty, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2002, at 12; Hannah Cleaver, Germany Under Pressure To Back Tobacco Treaty, REUTERS,
Jan. 27, 2003; Richard Waddington, Activists Say US, Japan, Germany Block Tobacco Pact, ABC
NEWS/REUTERS, Oct. 24, 2002, http://www.fctc.org/ news3l4.shtml.
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of these obligations falls within national governments' margin of
appreciation.1
67
Keenan v. United Kingdom, which addressed the affirmative obligations
of prison officials to prevent a mentally ill prisoner from committing
suicide, 168 may also provide a useful precedent for future tobacco control
litigation in the ECHR. In Keenan, the ECHR affirmed that Article 2 of the
European Convention requires government authorities to take reasonable steps
to protect individuals from an immediate risk to life if they know or should
know of the existence of such a risk.169 Noting that the prison officials'
obligations in Keenan were not affected by the prisoner's role in taking his
own life, the ECHR held that they had fulfilled their obligations by placing the
petitioner in the hospital and under watch when he displayed suicidal
tendencies.170 While the risk of contracting life-threatening diseases from
smoking or exposure to secondhand smoke may be less immediate than the
risk of suicide in Keenan, it should be no less evident to government
authorities. Nicotine addiction renders smokers, like persons in custody,
particularly vulnerable to tobacco-related diseases and death. As in Keenan,
this heightened vulnerability should be construed to impose a corresponding
duty on government authorities to take reasonable precautions to protect their
citizens. 1 1 At a minimum, such precautions should include the public
dissemination of information regarding the health risks of tobacco use, 172 the
imposition of cigarette warning label requirements, and prohibitions on
misleading and deceptive tobacco advertisements.
ECHR jurisprudence suggests that such tobacco advertising restrictions
would be consistent with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10
of the European Convention." The European Commission responded to an
application from a private Austrian association promoting the interests of non-
smokers by implicitly denouncing advertising that misleads consumers about
the health risks of tobacco products.' 74 The applicants alleged that a 1990
decision of the Austrian Supreme Court, which prohibited them from using
167. See Wockel v. Germany. The Commission also noted the competing interests of the
applicant as a non-smoker and other individuals who smoked. Id.
168. Keenan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27229/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38 (2001), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc.
169. Id. paras. 89-91, 101.
170. Id. para. 98.
171. See id. paras. 89-91.
172. This obligation is bolstered by Judge Jambrek's concurring opinion in Guerra & Others v.
Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357 (1998), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc,
which held that Article 2 of the European Convention prohibits a government from withholding
information about "circumstances which foreseeably, and on substantial grounds, present a real risk of
danger to health and physical integrity." Id. at 387.
173. The Convention provides that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to...
receive ... information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless
of frontiers . . . . The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of
health or morals [and] for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ....
European Convention, supra note 10, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
174. See Osterreichische Schutzgemeinschaft Fur Nichtraucher and Rockenbauer v. Austria,
App. No. 17200/91 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1991), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc.
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Philip Morris's "Camel" trademark 175 in the context of anti-smoking publicity,
unjustifiably interfered with their right to freedom of expression. After
acknowledging that the prohibition on the petitioners' use of the trademark
was consistent with Article 10(2) of the European Convention because it was
prescribed by Austrian law and was intended to protect the reputations and the
rights of others, the Commission focused on whether this prohibition was
necessary in a democratic society.' 76 The Commission ultimately concluded
that the Austrian Supreme Court's decision did not exceed the margin of
appreciation granted to national authorities in assessing the proportionality of
an interference with freedom of expression, because "without special reason
such as misleading advertising for tobacco using health symbols, a particular
brand must not be disparaged as a substitute for a whole category of
products."' 77 The Commission's reasoning suggests that the applicants might
have been accorded greater latitude if they had demonstrated that Philip
Morris's advertisements were likely to mislead prospective consumers about
the health consequences of smoking. In fact, the ECHR has explicitly affirmed
in non-tobacco-related cases that advertising restrictions imposed to protect
consumers from misleading or deceptive practices are consistent with Article
10.178
The impact of tobacco advertising restrictions on the right to freedom of
expression was also analyzed by the Advocate General of the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) 179 in the related cases of Germany v. Parliament and
Council 80 and R. v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Imperial Tobacco
Ltd. 181 Both cases addressed the validity of the prohibitions imposed by
European Parliament and Council Directive 98/43 (Advertising Directive) on
all direct and indirect advertising of tobacco products and the tobacco
industry's sponsorship of events.182
175. Both the applicants and the European Commission improperly attributed the Camel
trademark to Philip Morris rather than the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
176. Osterreichische Schutzgemeinschaft v. Austria.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., X & Church of Scientology v. Sweden, App. No. 7805/77, 16 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 58 (1979) (holding that restrictions enjoining the applicant from using certain
misleading statements in its advertisements for "E-meters" did not violate Article 10); Casado Coca v.
Spain, App. No. 15450/89, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, at para. 51 (1994) (Court report), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (noting that restrictions may be imposed to prevent untruthful or
misleading advertising).
179. The ECJ was established to ensure that European Community (EC) law is uniformly
interpreted and effectively applied. It has jurisdiction over disputes involving EC Member States and
European Union institutions, businesses, and individuals. Since all EC Member States are parties to the
European Convention, the ECJ derives guidance from the rights enumerated in the Convention when
interpreting and applying EC law. Anthony Lester, Freedom of Expression, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 465, 468 (J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
180. Germany v. Parliament & Council, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419,1-8423, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1175,
1183 (Opinion of Advocate General).
181. R. v. Sec'y of State for Health, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2000 E.C.R. 1-8599, 1-
8600, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1175, 1183 (Opinion of Advocate General).
182. Council Directive 98/43, 1998 O.J. (L 213/9). In the first case, Germany sought the
annulment of the Advertising Directive pursuant to Article 173 of the European Community Treaty
(Article 230, as amended), which authorizes the ECJ to review the legality of acts adopted by the
European Parliament and Council. In the second case, several tobacco manufacturing companies had
applied to the U.K. High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office), for judicial review
of the intention and obligation of the U.K. government to give effect to the requirements of the
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Although the ECJ ultimately annulled the Advertising Directive on
trade-related grounds, 183 Advocate General Fennelly's Opinion' 84 elaborated
on the human rights dimension of tobacco advertising bans. Noting that
ECHR jurisprudence permits reasonable limits on commercial speech, the
Advocate General reasoned that the Advertising Directive could be justified
only if it would reduce tobacco consumption and if less restrictive measures
would not be equally effective. 85 Based on the evidence presented,186 he
concluded that these standards had been met, except with respect to a
prohibition on the advertisement of non-tobacco goods and services bearing
brands or other distinguishing features associated with tobacco products.
The ECJ adopted the same distinction in its Judgment in the case brought by
Germany, which annulled the Advertising Directive and thereby rendered
moot the case brought by the United Kingdom.' 88 In December 2002, the
European Union passed a new law banning tobacco advertising from radio,
television, the Internet and print, and prohibiting tobacco companies from
sponsoring events such as Formula One motor racing, but excluding the types
Advertising Directive. The U.K. court then referred certain questions regarding the validity of the
Advertising Directive to the ECJ. Previously secret tobacco industry documents revealed that the
tobacco industry had tried to defeat the Advertising Directive by actively lobbying government officials
and industrial groups in Germany, the United Kingdom, and other EC Member States to protect its right
to freedom of expression. See BITTON ET AL., supra note 148, at 18-40.
183. Parliament & Council, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-8522-34, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. at 1265-71. For a
discussion of the trade-related aspects of this case, see Melissa Alegre, We've Come a Long Way Baby
(or Have We?): Banning Tobacco Advertising and Sponsorship in the European Union, 26 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. Rnv. 157, 162-66 (2003).
184. The ECJ is comprised of fifteen judges and eight advocates general, who assist the Court
by issuing opinions on pending cases. European Union Online, The Court of Justice of the European
Communities, at http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). The
persuasiveness of an advocate general's recommendations increases if the ECJ opts to follow them.
Telephone Interview with Jonathan Marks, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London, England (Feb. 16,
2003).
185. Parliament & Council, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-8489-90, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. at 1245 (Opinion of
Advocate General).
186. The evidence presented included reports prepared by the U.S. National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) and the Institut ftir Therapie- und Gesundheitsforschung, Kiel, which
established a direct correlation between tobacco advertising and youth smoking, as well as between
comprehensive advertising bans and reductions in average per capita tobacco consumption. The NBER
had concluded that the Advertising Directive would have reduced tobacco consumption by
approximately 6.9 percent during the sample period, and that more limited bans had been minimally
effective in reducing tobacco consumption. Id. at 1-8491-92, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. at 1247.
187. See id. at 1-8490-95, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. at 1245-5 1.
188. See Parliament & Council, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-8527-28, 1-8532, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. at 1268,
1271; R. v. Sec'y of State for Health, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2000 E.C.R. 1-8599, 1-8606,
[2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1175, 1272. Although the freedom to receive information, guaranteed by Article
10(2) of the European Convention, was not relevant in these cases, the Advocate General noted in his
Opinion that it might come into play if a customer sought information from a tobacco producer or
distributor about its products. See Parliament & Council, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-8494 & n.207, [2000] 3
C.M.L.R. at 1250 & n.216 (Opinion of Advocate General). If the producer or distributor failed to
respond, the State Party concerned would arguably have an obligation under Article 10 of the European
Convention to require disclosure of the requested information. See European Convention, supra note 10,
art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230. However, the ECHR would be unlikely to require a state to facilitate the
disclosure of such information on its own initiative. See Guerra & Others v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89,
26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357, 381-82 (1998), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (holding that the
Italian government did not have a positive obligation under Article 10(2) to inform the public about
dangers arising out of the operation of a chemical factory and how to proceed in the event of a major
accident).
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of restrictions that the ECJ had found problematic in the Advertising
Directive. 1
89
Many tobacco-related human rights claims remain to be litigated before
the ECHR. 190 Given the ECHR's past unwillingness to take a proactive stance
on tobacco control, progress is likely to be gradual at best. Cases must be
chosen strategically with a view toward emphasizing the human toll that will
result from maintaining the status quo in particular countries. The outcome of
these cases will be important because human rights institutions in other
regions of the world are likely to grant them considerable deference.
C. Expanding the Scope of Applicable Norms Through Advisory Opinions:
The Untapped Potential of the Inter-American System
The jurisdiction of the Inter-American System is governed primarily by
the American Convention on Human Rights and the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man. 19' To date, no tobacco-related human rights
petitions appear to have been filed in this system, which is comprised of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights. 192 However, the diverse mechanisms available to raise new
issues before these institutions offer great potential for progress in this arena.
Like the HRC and ECHR, the Inter-American Commission permits the filing
of individual petitions concerning alleged violations by states of rights
protected by the American Convention and the American Declaration. 193
189. See Alegre, supra note 183, at 166; Paul Meller, Europe Outlaws Tobacco Ads in
Magazines and Newspapers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at A12. See also Lizette Alvarez, Glen to Glen,
No Smoking at the Pub: Antitobacco Trend Has Reached Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at A3.
Arguing that the European Union's governing body exceeded its authority by promulgating the law,
Germany has challenged the law in the European Court of Justice. See Germany Appeals Europe's
Tobacco Ad Ban, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 14, 2003.
190. See, e.g., Edward Lestrade, Slovak Republic: The Right to Life and the Protection of Non-
Smokers in Slovakia, GLOBALINK NEWS & INFO. BULL., July 23, 2003 (arguing that the Slovak
government risks challenge in the ECHR for its failure to protect non-smokers from the deadly effects of
environmental tobacco smoke) (on file with author).
191. ACHR, supra note 10, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 143; American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, International Conference of American States, 9th Conf., OAS Doc.
OEA/ser. L./V.I.4 rev. (1948), reprinted in ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HANDBOOK OF
EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS 15, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 5
(1978).
192. The Inter-American Commission is composed of seven persons "of high moral character
and recognized competence in the field of human rights." ACHR, supra note 10, art. 34, 1144 U.N.T.S.
at 153-54. They are elected by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS)
from a list of candidates proposed by the governments of OAS Member States, but serve in their
personal capacities. Id. art. 36(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 154. The Inter-American Court consists of seven
judges, who are nationals of OAS Member States. Id. art. 52(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 157-58. They are
elected by the States Parties to the ACHR "from among jurists of the highest moral authority and of
recognized competence in the field of human rights," but also serve in their personal capacities. Id.
193. See Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Res. 447, 9th
Reg. Sess., art. 20 (1979) (granting the Inter-American Commission jurisdiction to examine
communications regarding governments that are not parties to the ACHR and to make appropriate
recommendations); ACHR, supra note 10, art. 44, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 155 (permitting any person, group,
ar non-governmental entity legally recognized in at least one OAS Member State to file petitions with
the Inter-American Commission "containing denunciations or complaints of violations" by States
Parties). See also Case 12.285 (Domingues v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. Rep. No. 62/02, para. 30
(2002); Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Adv. Op. OC-10/89, Inter-Am
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Unlike other human rights fora, the Inter-American Court exercises advisory
jurisdiction. 194
Following the submission of a petition, the Inter-American Commission
may receive testimony, documents, or other information regarding particular
human rights issues.195 Based on this evidence and other available information,
the Commission issues a report delineating the facts, the terms of any
settlement reached by the parties, or, in the absence of a settlement, its
conclusions. 196 If individual petition proceedings before the Inter-American
Commission do not result in a friendly settlement or if a targeted state fails to
comply with the Commission's recommendations within a prescribed period,
the Commission or the petitioning state may refer the matter to the contentious
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. 197 Like the ECHR, the Inter-
American Court is empowered to issue legally binding judgments.1
98
The Inter-American Commission and Court have accorded far-reaching
protection to the rights of vulnerable groups, including persons with mentaldisabilities 99 women 200 and children 2 Empirical evidence demonstrates the
particular susceptibility of children and adolescents to the tobacco industry's
202promotional tactics, as well as the heightened health risks of smoking and
exposure to secondhand smoke during childhood.2 °3 If such evidence has been
Ct. H.R. (ser. A.), No. 10, paras. 35-45 (1989); Case 9647 (Roach & Pinkerton v. United States), Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1, paras. 46-49 (1987).
194. See ACHR, supra note 10, art. 64, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159-60.
195. See id. art. 48, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 156-57.
196. See id. arts. 49-50, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 157.
197. See id. arts. 51, 63, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 157, 159. In order for the Inter-American Court to
hear such a case, the relevant State Party must have filed a declaration or special agreement recognizing
the Court's jurisdiction. Id. art. 62, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159.
198. Id. art. 68, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 160.
199. See Case 11.427 (Victor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 475, OEA/ser.
L./V./II.95, doc. 7 rev., paras. 53-54, 106-08 (1999) (noting that persons with mental disabilities
comprise a "particularly vulnerable group" entitled to special protection and holding that the
Government of Ecuador had violated the petitioner's rights to life, physical, mental, and moral integrity,
and protection from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment based on the injuries he suffered in
detention; in an effort to remedy these violations, the Government of Ecuador undertook to pay $30,000
in compensation, to seek the prosecution of the responsible individuals, and to establish a trust fund for
the benefit of the victim's family).
200. See Case 12.051 (Maria Da Penha v. Brazil), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 704, OEA/ser.
L./V.II.III, doc. 20 rev., paras. 45-49, 56 (2001) (noting the disproportionate number of female victims
of domestic violence and finding that the Government of Brazil had displayed a pattern of negligence
and failed to take effective action to prosecute and convict perpetrators). Cf American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 191, art. 7 (affirming the right of pregnant and nursing women
and of all children to "special protection, care and aid").
201. Villagrdn Morales et al. Case ("Street Children Case"), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No.
63 (1999) (finding multiple violations of the American Convention on Human Rights, and encouraging
the state to "conduct a real and effective investigation" of suspected human rights violators). Cf ACHR,
supra note 10, art. 19, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 150 (mandating special measures of protection for minors).
202. See, e.g., John P. Pierce et al., Smoking Initiation by Adolescent Girls, 1944 Through
1988: An Association with Target Advertising, 271 J. AMER. MED. ASW'N 608, 611 (1994) (concluding
that tobacco advertising campaigns targeting women were associated with an increase in smoking
among minor girls).
203. See NAT'L CANCER INST., supra note 70; SCIENTIFIC COMM. ON TOBACCO AND HEALTH,
supra note 70.
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compiled in countries that have ratified the American Convention, recourse to
the individual petition procedure might be productive.204
Alternatively, advocacy efforts could be targeted toward the expansion
of international human rights norms to encompass states' obligations to
undertake particular tobacco control initiatives.20 A proactive Member State
of the Organization of American States (OAS) or a qualified OAS organ such
as the Pan-American Health Organization could request an advisory opinion
from the Inter-American Court regarding the tobacco control implications of
relevant norms in the American Convention or other treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the Americas. 206 An OAS Member State could
also request an advisory opinion on the compatibility of its tobacco control
laws with the applicable provisions of these treaties. 2°7 Similar results could
be achieved through a hearing before the Inter-American Commission, which
may be held on the Commission's own initiative or at the request of any
interested party.20 8
The existing jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission and Court
can be construed strategically to address tobacco-related human rights
violations in OAS Member States. Article 4(1) of the American Convention
protects the right to life. z°9 In Villagrein Morales ("Street Children Case"), the
Inter-American Court interpreted this right broadly to require a state to
guarantee the creation of "conditions that guarantee a dignified existence. '210
A compelling argument could be made that such conditions should preclude
204. For maximum impact, individual petitions alleging tobacco-related human rights
violations should be filed initially against States Parties to the American Convention. Only petitions
filed pursuant to the American Convention may be referred to the Inter-American Court, which can issue
legally binding judgments.
205. These strategies are not mutually exclusive in the Inter-American System. By contrast,
the ECHR is prohibited from exercising advisory jurisdiction over any issue that might arise in the
course of proceedings before the European Commission or Court. See Protocol 2 to the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 11, 1950, art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 44.
206. See ACHR, supra note 10, art. 64(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159-60. Qualified OAS organs are
listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American States (1948), 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2436,
119 U.N.T.S. 48, 58, amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, O.A.S.
No. I-A.
207. See ACHR, supra note 10, art. 64(2), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 160.
208. See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
109th Special Ses., art. 59 (2000), amended by Inter-Am. C.H.R. 116th Reg. Sess. (2002),
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basicl6.htm. For example, the Inter-American Commission convened
hearings in both February and October 2001 regarding the rights of mentally disabled persons in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Based on recommendations proposed by PAHO, the Commission approved
the Recommendation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of the Mentally Ill, Inter-Am. C.H.R. lllth Special Sess. (2001),
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/chap.6e.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2003). See also Javier
Vasquez, Mechanisms of Protection Within the Inter-American System of Human Rights, Training
Workshop on Human Rights and Mental Health (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
Interview with Javier Vasquez, Division of Health Promotion and Protection, PAHO/WHO,
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 10, 2003).
209. See ACHR, supra note 10, art. 4(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145 ("Every person has the right to
have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of
conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.").
210. See Street Children Case, supra note 201, paras. 144, 146, 191 (finding that the
Guatemalan government had violated the petitioners' right to life by applying or tolerating a systematic
practice of violence against at-risk children in its territory).
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the type of harrowing death that many victims of tobacco-related disease in
the developing world are forced to suffer.
211
Article 5 of the American Convention, which is more expansive than
comparable provisions of the ICCPR and the European Convention, protects
the rights to physical integrity and freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment or treatment.212 Like the jurisprudence of the HRC, most of the
relevant decisions of the Inter-American Commission and Court have
involved prison conditions. Several of these decisions have highlighted
evidence of inadequate ventilation and lack of fresh air.213 In countries where
prisoners are forced to inhale secondhand smoke, similar evidence could be
presented to substantiate alleged violations of Article 5. These violations
could be remedied through legislation mandating that all prisoners have the
right to a smoke-free environment. The attribution of state responsibility for
rights violations in the prison context is clear because the government is the
guarantor of the rights of detainees. 214 By analogy, Article 5 should be
construed to require that all government facilities be smoke-free.
Claims alleging violations of the right to freedom of information based
on the tobacco industry's deceptive promotional tactics may be more difficult
to substantiate in the Inter-American System than in other human rights fora.
The Inter-American Commission and Court have construed the scope of
permissible restrictions on freedom of expression under Article 13 of the
American Convention 215 more narrowly than the HRC or the ECHR have
construed comparable provisions of the ICCPR and the European Convention.
Although the Inter-American Court has affirmed that such restrictions may be
"justified by reference to governmental objectives which, because of their
importance, clearly outweigh the social need for the full enjoyment of the
right Article 13 guarantees, '' 216 Article 13(2) of the American Convention
211. See, e.g., Rachel C. Koshy et al., Cancer Pain Management in Developing Countries: A
Mosaic of Complex Issues Resulting in Inadequate Analgesia, 6 SUPPORT CARE CANCER 430, 431 (1998)
(noting that cancer pain medications are not available to the vast majority of patients in Latin and South
America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa).
212. See ACHR, supra note 10, art. 5, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 146. Article 5 provides:
(1) Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected;
(2) No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or
treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person.
Id.
213. See Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C), No. 94, paras. 154, 155, 169 (2002); Cases 12.067 (Edwards v. Bahamas), 12.068 (Hall v. Bahamas),
and 12.086 (Schroeter & Bowleg v. Bahamas), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 603, OEA/ser. L./V./II.III, doc. 20
rev., paras. 196, 228 (2001). The Inter-American Commission has repeatedly noted that the U.N.
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners require adequate ventilation. See Case 12.028
(Knights v. Grenada), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 841, OEA/ser. L.N./II.III, doc. 20 rev., paras. 126, 127, 129
(2001); Case 11.826 (Lamey v. Jamaica), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 996, OEA/ser. L./V.II.1I1, doe. 20 rev.,
paras. 203, 204, 206 (2001).
214. See Neira Alegria Case, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 21, para. 60 (1995) (finding that
Article 5(2) of the ACHR requires the state to ensure a detainee's rights to life and humane treatment).
215. See ACHR, supra note 10, art. 13(l), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 148 (providing that "Everyone
has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes the freedom to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the
form of art, or through any other medium of his choice.").
216. See Compulsory Membership, supra note 159, para. 46.
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explicitly prohibits any form of prior censorship.2 17 The sole exception to this
prohibition is contained in Article 13(4), which permits censorship of "public
entertainments" for the moral protection of children and adolescents. 218 This
provision would arguably justify bans on tobacco advertisements in contexts
where children are most likely to view them. Because tobacco advertising
increases consumption of tobacco products by individuals of all ages and
nicotine addiction compromises smokers' ability to make informed decisions
to assume the inherent risks of their conduct, 219 the Inter-American
Commission and Court should be encouraged to treat tobacco advertising as a
special case that warrants a careful balancing of the rights involved.
Moreover, legislation imposing sanctions for advertisements that misrepresent
or distort the health risks of tobacco products could be justified under Article
13(2), which permits the imposition of liability for abusive exercises of
freedom of expression.
220
In countries where tobacco companies must obtain governmental
authorization before commencing operations, the state may have an obligation
under Article 13 to ensure that prospective consumers have access to
information regarding the human rights implications of these companies'
activities. The Inter-American Commission elaborated on this aspect of
Article 13 in its Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador.221 The
Commission concluded that the rights of indigenous populations in areas
targeted for oil exploitation by companies licensed by the government could
best be protected by requiring the government of Ecuador to improve the
dissemination of information about the expected environmental impact of
222these companies' activities on particular populations. The Commission
reasoned that access to information is a prerequisite for effective public
participation in relevant decision-making processes.2 2 3 In the tobacco control
context, this precedent suggests that governments may be required to counter
217. See ACHR, supra note 10, art. 13(2), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 149 ("The exercise of the right [to
freedom of expression] ...shall not be subject to prior censorship. ... ). See also Compulsory
Membership, supra note 159, para. 77 ("A system that controls the right of expression in the name of a
supposed guarantee of the correctness and truthfulness of the information that society receives can be
the source of great abuse and, ultimately, violates the right to information that this same society has.");
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Principles 5, 7 (2000),
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/principles.htm.
218. See ACHR, supra note 10, art. 13(4), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 149. The Inter-American Court
has defined "child" as a person who has not yet reached his or her eighteenth birthday. See Legal Status
and Human Rights of the Child, Adv. Op. OC-17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 17, para. 42 (2002).
219. See generally supra notes 72, 73, and 76 and accompanying text.
220. See ACHR, supra note 10, art. 13(2), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 149. The scope of such liability
must be expressly and precisely defined by law and no greater than necessary to achieve the ends
specified in the Convention. Compulsory Membership, supra note 159, paras. 38-40, 46-48. A
prerequisite to the subsequent imposition of liability is proof of actual malice, which may be
demonstrated through a showing of intention or negligence. See Claudio Grossman, Freedom of
Expression in the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 619, 640 (2002).
221. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OAS Doc.
OEA/ser. L./V./II.96, doc. 10 rev. 1, ch. IX (1997). The impetus for this report was the filing of a
petition on behalf of the indigenous Huorani people in 1990. After concluding that numerous claims
raised by the petitioners were prospective, the Commission opted to undertake a general evaluation of
the human rights situation in Ecuador pursuant to Article 22 of the American Convention. Id.
222. See id. ch. VII.
223. Id.
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misrepresentations by tobacco companies about the health consequences of
smoking and exposure to secondhand smoke, and the effectiveness of
particular tobacco control strategies. 224 Available remedies include
comprehensive information campaigns and the adoption of legislation
requiring detailed, culturally-specific health warnings on cigarette packages.
The tobacco-related human rights obligations of OAS Member States
could be made explicit in a detailed advisory opinion from the Inter-American
Court or advisory recommendations promulgated by the Inter-American
Commission. These pronouncements, which apply throughout the Americas,
may have more far-reaching impact than a judgment in an individual case.225
D. The FCTC Reconsidered
Existing international human rights institutions hold great promise for
promoting government accountability for tobacco-related human rights
violations. Even before the FCTC enters into force, advocates and decision-
makers could use its provisions, along with applicable principles and
recommendations promulgated by WHO and other intergovernmental
organizations, as benchmarks for delineating the tobacco control obligations
of governments that are encompassed by prevailing human rights norms.226
Meanwhile, the strategies employed by existing institutions could be used to
strengthen the implementation mechanisms embodied in the FCTC.
As discussed in Part II, the reporting process in the draft FCTC is not
well-defined. If subsequently negotiated protocols include more detailed
reporting guidelines, those developed by the CESCR could provide a useful
model. To ensure that state reports are objectively evaluated, an independent
expert body akin to the CESCR or the HRC could be established.227 Moreover,
a process of constructive dialogue along the lines of the CESCR process could
be adopted to engage government representatives in developing effective
country-specific strategies for surmounting obstacles to FCTC
implementation. Like the CESCR, the FCTC expert body should be explicitly
permitted to solicit information from tobacco control NGOs in evaluating state
reports and monitoring the implementation of its recommendations. 228
224. See PAHO, supra note 7, at 21-32 (regarding the prevalence of such misrepresentations
by Philip Morris and British American Tobacco in Latin America).
225. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights:
Contributing to the Evolution of International Human Rights Law, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 241, 242, 249-50
(2002); Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM.
J. INT'LL. 1, 25 (1985).
226. The use of non-binding principles and recommendations to delineate the scope of existing
human rights norms proved effective in Case 11.427, supra note 199. Interview with Javier Vasquez,
supra note 208.
227. Independent expert bodies have also been established to evaluate state reports under
many other international human rights treaties. See, e.g., CRC, supra note 10, art. 43, 28 I.L.M. at 1461;
CEDAW, supra note 10, art. 17, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 21; ICERD, supra note 10, art. 8, 660 U.N.T.S. at
224.
228. The FCTC could also assign monitoring responsibilities directly to NGOs. Notably,
under the International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes, which was adopted by the World
Health Assembly in 1981, NGOs were tasked with reporting violations to manufacturers and distributors
of breast-milk substitutes, as well as government authorities. This structure has reportedly encouraged
the development of an international network of NGOs that monitor and report on compliance with the
2004]
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In addition to evaluating state reports, the FCTC expert body could
exercise advisory jurisdiction modeled on that of the Inter-American Court or
the more informal procedures utilized by the Inter-American Commission.
States Parties to the FCTC and the WHO could then file requests for advisory
opinions to clarify the obligations imposed by specific treaty provisions and to
determine whether a particular country's domestic legislation is consistent
with these obligations. In addition, advisory proceedings would provide a non-
adversarial forum for dialogue among States Parties and permit input from
tobacco control NGOs during public hearings and in less formal settings.
Existing human rights mechanisms also provide various models for
highlighting and addressing governments' violations of their treaty
obligations. The individual petition procedures under the First Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR, the European Convention, and the American
229Convention permit the filing of petitions by victims or their representatives.
Whether or not the decisions by these fora are legally enforceable, they often
generate international condemnation sufficient to shame governments into
compliance with their treaty obligations. 23 The creation of comparable
decision-making fora within the FCTC regime could yield similar results.
The explicit incorporation of such implementation mechanisms into the
FCTC may be less important than fostering an awareness of their utility
among the Members of the Conference of the Parties or any subsequently
established FCTC implementation body. In fact, a number of the mechanisms
referenced in the foregoing sections, including those employed by the CESCR
and the HRC's Special Rapporteur for the Follow-Up of Views, were not
envisioned at the time the relevant treaties were drafted, but instead evolved
over time as the need arose. The Conference could heighten its ability to
promote compliance by States Parties by interpreting its mandate to permit the
adoption of some or all of these implementation mechanisms.
V. FROM STATE RESPONSIBILITY TO NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
Both the Conference of the Parties and the human rights institutions
discussed in Part IV are authorized to affirm the responsibility of states for
treaty violations and to make recommendations intended to address these
violations. Private tobacco companies, however, whose activities often
precipitate such violations either directly or by virtue of the political and
code. See WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF MARKETING OF BREAST-MILK
SUBSTITUTES, Annex 3, WHO Doc. WHA34/1981/REC/1 (1981), http://www.who.int/nut/documents/
code english.pdf; INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 144-45
(2002).
229. For the specific provisions that may be used to file these petitions, see supra note 126 (for
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR), supra note 154 (for the European Convention), and supra
note 193 (for the American Convention).
230. For more on shaming governments into treaty compliance, see, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland,
Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2001); Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 99-113 (1988); and Dorothy Q. Thomas,
Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An Internationalized Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARV.
HUM. RT. J. 15, 17 (1996).
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economic influence they exercise over national governments, 231 are not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Conference or any existing human rights
232institution. Some intergovernmental organizations have sought to address
this deficiency by promulgating human rights guidelines for corporations.
233
While these instruments may indicate the current expectations of many
governments regarding corporate responsibility for human rights violations,
private corporations, including tobacco companies, are not legally obligated to
comply with them.
234
The effectiveness of international human rights bodies in promoting
global tobacco control will ultimately depend on the willingness of national
legislatures and courts to implement and enforce their decisions. Some
national courts have independently construed domestic human rights norms,
which replicate norms contained in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, to require
governments to undertake far-reaching tobacco control measures. These
decisions may, in turn, influence courts in other regions of the world and
prompt international human rights institutions to devote greater attention to
tobacco-related human rights violations.
235
The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Deora v. India
demonstrates the potential for promoting tobacco control through domestic
human rights litigation. 236 The petition, filed by the President of the Mumbai
Regional Congress Committee, Shri Murli Deora, argued that the Union of
India had violated the constitutional rights of its citizens to life, health, and a
clean environment by failing to undertake adequate tobacco control
237initiatives. On November 2, 2001, the Indian Supreme Court ruled in favor
of the petitioner and ordered the states of India to ban smoking in hospitals,
educational institutions, railways and other public transportation facilities,
231. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
232. As Andrew Clapham has pointed out, the absence of applicable enforcement procedures
does not negate the existence of corporate obligations pursuant to international human rights treaties.
See Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law over Legal
Persons, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (Menno T.
Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
233. See Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy, ILO Doc. OB Vol. LXI, 1978 (ser. A), No. 1 (1977); Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N.
ESCOR Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Protection of Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: 2003 (2003).
234. However, as Michael Akehurst has noted, such "soft law" documents may affect judicial
or quasi-judicial decision-making and the evolution of new international norms. See MICHAEL B.
AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-55 (6th ed. 1996). For an innovative
alternative approach for deriving international norms of corporate responsibility, see Steven R. Ratner,
Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 11l YALE L.J. 443, 496-524 (2001).
235. A similar interplay between national and international jurisprudence is evident in the field
of international criminal law. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Constructing a Common Law of Humanity: The
Jurisprudence of National and International War Crimes Trials, Address Before the University of Haifa
Symposium on Human Rights Violations in Latin American and the Universalization of Human Rights:
Moral and Legal Concerns (Jan. 14, 2002) (on file with author).
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courts, public offices, libraries, and auditoriums throughout the country.238 In
response to the petitioner's arguments that foreign tobacco companies were
circumventing prevailing advertising restrictions, the Indian Supreme Court
further directed police commissioners of major cities to report ongoing efforts
to enforce the Indian advertising code.239
Using a similar strategy, a group of tobacco control lawyers in
Bangladesh challenged BAT's advertising practices on the grounds that such
practices violated certain fundamental rights guaranteed under the
constitution. The impetus for the lawsuit was the November 1999 arrival in
Bangladesh's Chittagong port of the Voyage of Discovery, a touring luxury
yacht, as part of a larger BAT campaign to cultivate a market for its Gold Leaf
cigarettes among youth in Africa and Asia.240 The petitioners, officials of the
Bangladesh National Drug Federation, alleged that BAT's exhibition of the
vessel, which was covered with promotional messages without statutorily
required health warnings, violated Bangladeshi citizens' constitutionally
protected rights to life and liberty.241 Noting that the high rate of illiteracy in
Bangladesh undermined the efficacy of statutorily required health warnings,
242
the petitioners called for a total ban on the advertisement and promotion of
tobacco products.
243
The decision issued by the Bangladesh Supreme Court on February 7,
2000,24 cites numerous decisions of neighboring South Asian countries which
emphasize the human rights dimension of tobacco control. 24 5 Invoking the
rights to dignity and health guaranteed, respectively, by Articles 11 and 18 of
the Constitution of Bangladesh, the court banned advertisements of tobacco
products in newspapers, magazines, billboards, and electronic media beyond
the period of any existing contracts with tobacco manufacturers or their
246agents. The court further prohibited the Government of Bangladesh from
undertaking or encouraging any promotional ventures that resembled "Voyage
238. Id. See also D. DOUGLAS BLANKE, TOWARDS HEALTH WITH JUSTICE: LITIGATION AND
PUBLIC INQUIRIES AS TOOLS FOR TOBACCO CONTROL 37-41 (WHO Tobacco Free Initiative, 2002),
http://repositories.cdlib.org/context/tc/article/1031/type/pdflviewcontent. National legislation intended
to achieve these goals was under consideration by the Indian Parliament at the time of the decision and
has since been passed. See id. at 38; E-mail from Rani Jethmalani, Advocate, Supreme Court of India, to
author (Oct. 13, 2003) (on file with author).
239. See BLANKE, supra note 238, at 37-41.
240. See Islam & Mohammad v. Bangladesh, W.P. Nos. 1825/99, 4521/99, at 6 (2000)
(Bangl.), available at http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?ID=609. The defendants in this matter
also included BAT.
241. Id.
242. The relevant statute requires the warning "smoking is dangerous for health" to be printed
in easily readable and understood Bengali on a prominent and distinct space of the package or container
of tobacco products available for sale, and prohibits any advertisement of such products without the
warning. See id. at 11.
243. Id.
244. Islam & Mohammad v. Bangladesh, W.P. Nos. 1825/99, 4521/99 (2000) (Bangl.),
available at http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?ID=609.
245. See, e.g., Ramakrishnan v. Kerala, A.I.R. 1999 Ker. 38 (India) (holding that public
smoking violated the right of non-smokers to life, which encompassed the right to pollution-free air and
a decent environment); Pak. Chest Found. v. Pakistan, 1997 CLC 1379, W.P. No. 14433/94 (Pak.)
(holding that television commercials and radio broadcasts relating to cigarettes induce smoking and
thereby endanger life and bodily integrity).
246. See Islam & Mohammad v. Bangladesh, at 39-40.
Smokescreens and State Responsibility
of Discovery. 247 In addition, the court banned smoking in public places
pursuant to Article 31 of the constitution, which protects the right to life of
Bangladeshi citizens, 24 and called upon the government to take more far-
reaching steps to halt the manufacturing, production, and marketing of
tobacco products.249 At the time of this writing, this decision was on appeal.25 °
Although BAT obtained a stay of the judgment pending the hearing of
the appeal, the Bangladeshi Supreme Court's decision offers a useful model
for advocates and courts seeking to prevent tobacco-related human rights
violations in other countries. Drawing on the Bangladeshi experience, the
Environmental Action Network (TEAN), a public interest litigation group in
Kampala, Uganda, filed a similar case in the Uganda High Court. The
Ugandan decision, issued in December 2002, held that smoking in public
places violates the rights of non-smokers to life and to a clean and healthy
environment. 25 1 In both Bangladesh and Uganda, these cases have served as
the impetus for the promulgation of new tobacco control laws, which are
currently under consideration by the legislatures of both countries. 252
VI. CONCLUSION
WHO's decision to invoke its treaty-making authority for the first time
in its institutional history signifies an acknowledgement by its Member States
of the gravity of the tobacco epidemic and their commitment to exploring
innovative solutions. The international and domestic human rights strategies
discussed in this Article should be among those solutions. Moreover, the
integration into the FCTC of implementation mechanisms employed by
existing human rights institutions-including reporting requirements,
individual petition procedures, and advisory opinions-would enhance the
likelihood of promoting compliance by States Parties. Confronted with
heightened scrutiny of their conduct, governments would have greater
253incentives to take their FCTC commitments seriously.
247. Id.
248. This case also implicates the right to freedom of expression, which has been construed
under the Bangladeshi Constitution to incorporate the right to receive information. In response to BAT's
allegation that the relief requested would violate its right to freedom of expression, the petitioners
asserted that BAT's aggressive marketing campaign exploited prospective consumers' low level of
awareness of the health consequences of tobacco consumption and thereby violated their right to
freedom of information. Interview with Tania Amer, Barrister, The Law Associates, Washington, D.C.
(June 6, 2002). The Bangladeshi Supreme Court's decision did not address this issue explicitly.
249. See Islam & Mohammed v. Bangladesh, at 32. Recommended strategies included
providing crop-switching subsidies to farmers, assisting tobacco workers in finding alternative jobs,
restricting the issuance of licenses for tobacco factories, directing existing tobacco companies to engage
in other business pursuits, and eventually prohibiting imports of tobacco products. Id. at 39.
250. E-mail from Debra Efroymson, Regional Director, PATH Canada, to author (Nov. 11,
2003) (on file with author).
251. See Envtl. Action Network Ltd. v. Att'y Gen. of Uganda & Nat'l Envtl. Mgrnt. Auth.,
Misc. App. No. 39 of 2001 (Order, Dec. 11, 2002) (Uganda) (on file with author).
252. See BLANKE, supra note 238, at 36; E-mail from Philip Karugaba, Director, The
Environmental Action Network, to author (Nov. 9, 2003) (on file with author).
253. As Steven Ratner has noted, NGOs may have an important role to play in eliciting treaty
compliance by states. See Ratner, supra note 234, at 543 (noting that "[t]he changing of expectations...
must often begin with civil society before governments can be expected to respond").
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The increased use of international human rights institutions to address
tobacco-related human rights violations can be expected to highlight the role
of the tobacco industry in derailing effective tobacco control initiatives by
national governments. By codifying minimum requirements for global
tobacco control, the FCTC, together with the jurisprudence of international
human rights institutions, will provide a common frame of reference for
states. These standards should inspire more comprehensive national tobacco
control legislation and more vigorous enforcement efforts by national courts.
Conversely, proactive efforts by national courts to expand the scope of
domestic human rights norms to encompass tobacco control guarantees may
raise the profile of tobacco-related human rights violations at the international
level.
Even if states do not comply immediately with their international
obligations to promote tobacco control, progress may still be achieved. The
FCTC negotiations have initiated a valuable process of dialogue among
governments, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and scholars from
diverse disciplines. The use of international human rights institutions and
national courts to address tobacco-related human rights violations will involve
an even broader range of participants in the debate about effective tobacco
control strategies. The momentum created by these developments may
ultimately embolden governments to defy the will of the tobacco industry
more effectively than any treaty.
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